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Preface 
This report has been prepared by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the 
aegis of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is a grouping of 
national government authorities from countries across Europe. The Consortium provides 
sponsorship for EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis of the 
regional policies of European countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and 
Competition policies. Over the past year, EoRPA members have comprised the following 
partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry for the 
Economy and Technology), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Energie, Bauen, Wohnen und Verkehr des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Ministry for the Economy, Energy, Construction, Housing and 
Transport of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen), Düsseldorf 
 
Italy 
x Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
Switzerland 
x Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs), Bern 
United Kingdom 
x East Midlands Development Agency, on behalf of the English RDAs 
x Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
x The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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The research for this report was undertaken by EPRC in consultation with EoRPA partners. It 
involved a programme of desk research and fieldwork visits among national and regional 
authorities in sponsoring countries during the first half of 2011. The EoRPA research 
programme is coordinated by Professor John Bachtler, Fiona Wishlade and Heidi Vironen. 
The report was written by Carlos Mendez, John Bachtler and Fiona Wishlade and draws on 
country-specific research contributed by the following research team:  
Austria: Stefan Kah, EPRC Lithuania: Inga Bartkeviciute, Jonas 
Jatkauskas, UAB BGI Consulting 
Belgium: Prof Norbert Vanhove, T&R Luxembourg: Prof Norbert Vanhove, T&R  
Bulgaria: Prof Julia Spiridinova, ProlnfraConsult Malta: Stephanie Vella, E-Cubed 
Consultants 
Czech Republic: Marie Feĥtrová, Lucie 
Jungwiertová, Jiĥí Blažek, Charles University 
Netherlands: Prof John Bachtler, EPRC 
Cyprus: Victoria Chorafa, LKN Analysis Norway: Fiona Wishlade, EPRC 
Denmark: Prof Henrik Halkier, Aalborg University Poland: Dr Martin Ferry, EPRC 
Estonia: Dr Kristina Tõnnisson, University of Tartu Portugal: Carlos Mendez, EPRC 
Finland: Heidi Vironen, EPRC Romania: Prof Daniela-Luminita 
Constantin, Academy of Economic Studies 
France: Frederike Gross, EPRC Slovakia: Martin Obuch, Consulting 
Associates 
Germany: Dr Sara Davies, EPRC Slovenia: Dr Damjan Kavaš, Institute for 
Economic Research  
Greece: Victoria Chorafa, LKN Analysis Spain: Carlos Mendez, EPRC 
Hungary: Prof Ilona Pálné Kovacs, Centre for 
Regional Studies 
Sweden: Heidi Vironen, EPRC 
Ireland: Prof David Charles, EPRC Switzerland: Frederike Gross and Stefan 
Kah, EPRC 
Italy: Dr Laura Polverari, EPRC United Kingdom: Dr Martin Ferry and Rona 
Michie, EPRC 
Latvia: Prof Tatjana Muravska, University of 
Latvia 
 
 
Many thanks are due to everyone who participated in the research. Thanks also to Dr Keith 
Clement, Lynn Ogilvie and Alyson Ross for editorial, coordination and secretarial support 
respectively. In addition, the European Policies Research Centre gratefully acknowledges 
the financial support provided by the members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
 
Disclaimer 
It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
represent the views of individual members of the EoRPA Consortium. 
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TITLE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
After a protracted period of informal consultation and debate, the European Commission 
published its budgetary proposals for the 2014-2020 Multi-annual Financial Framework at 
the end of June 2011, followed by the tabling of the Cohesion policy regulatory package in 
October 2011. The aim of this paper is to provide a review and assessment of the debate on 
the reform of EU Cohesion policy over the past year. It begins with a review of the context 
for reform, examining EU crisis management measures and broader policy developments. 
The Commission’s proposals on the MFF are then examined, followed by an analysis of the 
implications for national and regional eligibility and financial allocations under EU Cohesion 
policy. The policy dimensions of the post-2013 Cohesion policy proposals are reviewed in 
detail, and the paper concludes with issues and questions for discussion. 
Context for reform 
The context for EU policy reform over the last year has been difficult to say the least. The 
fragile recovery and the Euro crisis have unleashed economic and political uncertainty, 
hostile public reactions against the EU’s responses, and threats against the Union’s 
fundamental principles. Nevertheless, various measures have been agreed to strengthen 
economic governance and the pressure to find a more sustainable institutional design for 
the Euro is rising. Progress in the EU’s overarching Europe 2020 strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth includes the formal adoption of the integrated guidelines, 
the tabling of all seven flagship initiatives and the completion of the first European 
semester. For its part, DG Regio issued two Communications on ‘smart growth’ and 
‘sustainable growth’, highlighting the contribution of Cohesion policy to Europe 2020 
objectives and flagship initiatives as well as setting out a series of recommendations to 
increase their alignment further during the remainder of the 2007-13 period and beyond  
A budget for Europe 2020 
The Commission presented its proposals on the Multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-20 
at the end of June 2011. A total budget of €1,025 billion in commitment appropriations is 
envisaged, representing a 3.2 percent increase compared to 2007-2013 or 5 percent if the 
‘outside MFF’ items are included. The main budget headings have been repackaged to 
emphasise Europe 2020 objectives, Cohesion policy and a new infrastructure fund (the 
‘Connecting Europe facility’) being grouped into a sub-ceiling of the ‘Smart and inclusive 
growth’ heading.  
The CAP and Cohesion policy would see their total allocations fall, although both would still 
remain the largest items of EU budgetary expenditure with the Cohesion share overtaking 
that of agriculture for the first time. Cohesion policy funding would fall by some five 
percent, from €354.8 billion to €336 billion. This equates to a 36.7 percent share of the 
2014-2020 MFF, slightly higher than the 35 percent share in 2007-13.  
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On the income side of the budget, the Commission proposes two new own resources, a 
Financial Transaction Tax and an EU VAT component in order to render the financing of the 
EU more transparent and fair; and proposes to simplify the system of corrections and 
rebates by replacing these by a system of fixed annual lump sums. 
Cohesion policy scenarios 2014+: eligibility and allocations 
A somewhat different budgetary and eligibility landscape emerges from the Budget 2020 
proposals for Cohesion policy. This partly owes to regional economic growth and the use of 
EU27 averages which together have the effect of reducing significantly the coverage of the 
Convergence regions. In particular, regional growth would result in several German and 
Spanish regions losing Convergence status, along with the capital regions of Poland and 
Romania. The introduction of a new definition of transitional region will also alter the 
pattern of intervention. This will comprise: former Convergence regions that have 
‘outgrown’ that status – this is in line with past transitional arrangements; and regions with 
GDP in the range 75-90 percent of the EU27 average. This is a break with past practice 
creating a new category of assisted area covering over 11 percent of the EU15 population. 
Overall, the Budget 2020 proposals suggest a modest decrease in the Cohesion Policy 
budget. This is largely borne by a reduction in Convergence spending, although per capita 
spend on Convergence would rise slightly; RCE spending would rise significantly both in 
absolute and per capita terms; and Transition region spending would increase by half. The 
absorption cap will be critical in determining financial allocations for the least prosperous 
Member States. For these countries, the cap proposed is substantially lower than it was in 
2007-13. 
Cohesion policy directions 2014+: the new regulatory framework 
The tabling of the Cohesion policy regulatory package is due to take place on 6 October 
2011, although the key directions of reform were already well-known since the publication 
of the Fifth Cohesion Report in November 2010: closer alignment with and thematic 
concentration on the Europe 2020 Strategy; greater strategic coherence across shared 
management funds; a more binding contractual relationship with the Member States; a new 
performance framework; more use of new financial instruments; and greater 
proportionality and simplification in administrative rules.  
An intensive examination of the draft legislative package of Cohesion policy regulations will 
be undertaken in the Structural Actions Working Party during the latter half of the Polish 
Presidency. Nevertheless, mixed reactions to the reform options and proposals were 
already evident in the various consultations and informal discussions held in EU working 
groups, seminars and meetings organised by the previous Presidencies over the past year. 
Amongst the most contentious issues are the proposals on: thematic concentration on 
Europe 2020 objectives, particularly the level of flexibility available for countries and 
regions in the programming of the funds; the scope of conditionalities and use of sanctions 
under the performance framework; and the degree to which simplification will be achieved 
in practice. 
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Issues for discussion  
A preliminary set of questions for discussion at the EoRPA meeting are: 
x How should el igibi l i t y and aid int ensit y be st ruct ured t o accommodat e t he mix of  
regions fal l ing int o t he Transit ion cat egory?  
x How can an opt imal balance be st ruck bet ween themat ic and t errit orial  obj ect ives 
and priorit ies? 
x Would t he (re)int roduct ion of  mult i-fund OPs encourage more integrat ed 
approaches? 
x Has t he Commission found an appropriat e balance bet ween the need t o improve 
performance and ensure t hat  t he condit ional it ies are acceptable t o, and manageable 
by, Member St at es? What  changes could improve t he proposals? 
x What  specif ic changes t o t he regulat ions would faci l it at e a more proport ionate, r isk-
based and fair approach t o shared management ?  
x To what  extent  would an umbrel la regulat ion, and t he harmonisat ion of  (some) 
rules, be seen as desirable? What  are t he priorit ies for harmonising rules? 
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A Budget and Cohesion Policy for Europe 2020: 
Let the Negotiations Begin  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The stage has been set for the formal negotiations on the reform of Cohesion policy post-
2013. After an extended period of informal consultation and debate, the European 
Commission published its budgetary proposals for the 2014-2020 Multi-annual Financial 
Framework at the end of June 2011 setting out the key financial parameters and reform 
principles for all EU policies. The tabling of the Cohesion policy regulatory package is due 
to take place on 6 October 2011, although the key directions of reform were already well-
known since the publication of the Fifth Cohesion Report in November 2010:  
x close alignment with and thematic concentration on the Europe 2020 Strategy;  
x greater strategic coherence across shared management funds;  
x A more binding contractual relationship with the Member States through partnership 
contracts;  
x A new performance framework involving conditionalities and performance review of the 
achievement of milestones with the possibility of financial sanctions;  
x more use of new financial instruments;  
x greater proportionality and simplification in administrative rules; and 
x the introduction of a new category of ‘Transition’ regions. 
It is now the task of the Member States to reach a budgetary settlement on the budget, 
negotiate an agreement on the package of regulations and achieve a compromise with the 
European Parliament. The context for the negotiations is difficult. The fragile recovery and 
the Euro crisis have cast a long shadow of uncertainty over the EU and even brought into 
question some of the Union’s fundamental values. The principle of solidarity is openly 
contested due to fears of a ‘Union of transfers’, and the threat of a two-speed Europe 
looms large with the mounting pressure of a Greek default and potentially a break up of the 
Eurozone. Some progress on economic governance has been made, albeit timidly and in 
reactive mode. A ‘six pack’ of legislative measures to strengthen surveillance and sanctions 
were adopted by the Commission, and the pressure to agree a more sustainable 
institutional design for the Euro is rising.  
Times of economic crisis and fiscal constraint inevitably bring a harder line towards the EU 
budget and greater demands for value-for-money. The Commission’s proposals on the 2014-
2020 MFF have unsurprisingly elicited negative reactions from net contributors for being too 
high in the present circumstances of fiscal consolidation and austerity. With Cohesion policy 
set to become the largest budgetary item of EU expenditure, overtaking agriculture’s share 
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for the first time, it is likely to face pressure for cuts in the upcoming negotiations. Give 
the redistributive stakes involved, decisions on the Cohesion budget, eligibility and 
allocations across countries and regions, and the split between funds and priorities are 
likely to be contentious.   
An intensive examination of the draft legislative package of Cohesion policy regulations will 
be undertaken in the Structural Actions Working Party during the latter half of the Polish 
Presidency. Mixed reactions to the reform options and proposals were already evident in 
the various consultations and informal discussions held in EU working groups, seminars and 
meetings organised by the previous Presidencies. Amongst the most contentious issues are 
the proposals on: thematic concentration on Europe 2020 objectives, particularly the level 
of flexibility available for countries and regions in the programming of the funds; the scope 
of conditionalities and use of sanctions under the performance framework; and the degree 
to which simplification will be achieved in practice. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a review and assessment of the debate on the reform of 
EU Cohesion policy over the past year. It begins by reviewing the context for the reform 
debate with respect to political and economic developments over the past year (section 2). 
It then summarises the European Commission’s proposals for the next multi-annual financial 
framework, the initial reactions of Member States and the negotiation stance of the 
European Parliament (section 3). The implications of the proposals for EU Cohesion policy 
eligibility and allocations in 2014-2020 are assessed on the basis of the latest data (section 
4). The paper then turns to the policy dimensions of the Cohesion policy reform through a 
detailed assessment of the Commission’s proposals and national reactions (Section 5). 
Finally, the paper presents some conclusions and issues for discussion (Section 6). 
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2. THE CONTEXT FOR POLICY REFORM  
The context for EU policy reform over the last year has been difficult to say the least. The 
fragile recovery and the Euro crisis have unleashed economic and political uncertainty, 
hostile public reactions against the EU’s responses (or lack thereof), and threats against the 
Union’s fundamental principles. Nevertheless, various measures have been agreed to 
strengthen economic governance and the pressure to find a more sustainable institutional 
design for the Euro is rising. Progress in the EU’s overarching Europe 2020 strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth includes the formal adoption of the integrated 
guidelines, the tabling of all seven flagship initiatives and the completion of the first 
European semester.   
2.1 EU Crisis Management and Economic Governance Reform 
Economic and financial developments over the last year underscore the fragility of the 
recovery in many EU countries and the ongoing legacy of the crisis across Europe. As 
documented in the EU’s annual growth survey for 2011,1 there has been a large loss of 
economic activity, a substantial increase in unemployment, a sharp fall in productivity, and 
badly weakened public finances. Eleven Member States are forecast to remain at lower 
output levels than before the crisis by the end of 2012, and EU gross government debt in 
the Euro area increased to around 85 percent of GDP in 2010 or 80 percent EU-wide. 
Government deficit ratios (relative to GDP) were greater than the target reference value of 
-3 percent of GDP in 22 of the Member States in 2010, the highest being in Ireland (-32.4 %), 
Greece (-10.5 %),the United Kingdom (-10.4 %), Spain (-9.2 %) and Portugal (-9.1 %).2 As a 
result, the sustainability of public finances has become “ t he key pol icy concern in t he wake 
of  t he crisis” .3 A concerted shift towards fiscal consolidation has been undertaken in many 
European countries, with important implications for the negotiation of the post-2013 EU 
Budget.  
Continued uncertainty and speculation about sovereign indebtedness has led to important 
changes to EU economic governance. The Stability and Growth Pact is being reformed to 
reinforce economic and fiscal coordination, including a new excessive imbalances 
procedure. An agreement was reached on the creation of a European Stability Mechanism in 
December 2010 as a permanent rescue funding programme to succeed the European 
Financial Stability Mechanism which expires in 2013. A Euro-Plus Pact was subsequently 
adopted in March 2011 committing eurozone members (joined by Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) to a list of reforms intended to improve fiscal 
strength and competitiveness on the basis of the open method of coordination.  
Renewed pressure from the sovereign debt crisis led to an agreement on a new package of 
measures at a special summit of Heads of State in the Euro area in July 2011. Additional 
                                                 
1 European Commission (2011) Annual Growt h Survey: advancing t he EU's comprehensive response t o 
t he crisis, COM(2011) 11 final, 12.1.2010, Brussels. 
2 Eurostat, Government finance statistics, August 2011. 
3 European Commission (2011) Public finances in EMU - 2011, European Economy, 3/2011, Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs Brussels, European Commission, Brussels. 
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loans would be granted to Greece amounting to €109 billion, including private sector 
contributions, and lending terms were relaxed. The length of repayment terms were 
doubled for Ireland and Portugal, which had also received bail-outs, and additional powers 
were granted to the European Financial Stability Mechanism to buy up bonds and to make 
credit available to countries such as Spain and Italy that were facing growing borrowing 
costs.  
Of particular note in relation to Cohesion policy is the decision to allow Member States that 
have received financial assistance under a programme from the European Stabilisation 
Mechanism for the euro countries or from the Balance of Payments (BoP) mechanism for 
non-euro countries (Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania) to higher EU co-
financing rates on a temporary basis. 4   
With respect to domestic politics, EU policy responses to the crisis have elicited public 
hostility in various countries. The strict conditionality terms imposed to qualify for bail 
outs has led to a wave of protests in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, while strikes in France 
were sparked by the government’s acceptance of the Euro-plus pact which includes 
measures on wage restraint and pensions. In parallel, public opposition in the creditor 
countries is causing electoral backlashes, particularly in Germany and Finland, but also in 
the Netherlands and Austria. The majority of the EU population now have an overall 
negative opinion of the EU; in only three countries (Bulgaria, Ireland and Romania) do more 
than half the population have a positive view of the EU. Further, in the new Member States, 
support for joining the euro and its perceived benefits, has been declining for two years.5 
In this turbulent context, and with lower than expected growth in both Germany and 
France, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to commit to 
greater integration in the eurozone during a Franco-German summit in August 2011.6 A 
joint letter to President van Rompuy included pledges to prepare annual budgets on 
harmonised economic outlooks, to work towards a common corporation tax by 2013 and to 
hold twice yearly summits with other eurozone members.7 The French and German leaders 
went on to recommend that eurozone members adopt commitments to balance their 
budgets in their constitutions or other legislation and backed the idea of a European tax on 
financial transactions.  
Cohesion policy also featured in the Franco-German letter, offering support for the 
Commission’s proposals on macro-economic conditionalities and even calling for the 
                                                 
4 European Commission (2011) Proposal  for a  Regulat ion of  t he European Parl iament  and of  t he 
Council   amending Council  Regulat ion (EC) 1083/ 2006 as regards cert ain provisions relat ing t o 
f inancial  management  for cert ain Members St at es experiencing or t hreat ened wit h serious 
dif f icul t ies wit h respect  t o t heir f inancial  st abil i t y, COM(2011) 482 final, 1.8.2011, Brussels.   
5  European Commission (2011) Public opinion in the European Union, Eurobarometer 75, DG 
Communication, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. European Commission (2011) 
Introduction of the euro in the new Member States – Round 12, Flash Eurobarometer 329, DG 
Communication, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. 
6 Financial Times (2011) Merkel and Sarkozy pledge to defend euro, 18 August 2011, Financial Times. 
7  The letter can be downloaded from the Élysée website: 
http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank_objects/lettre_english_final_version.pdf
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Commission to be involved in project selection in countries receiving bail-outs or the 
creation of an EU fund to be administered by the Commission:  
St ruct ural  and cohesion funds should be used t o support  essent ial  reforms to 
enhance economic growth and compet it iveness in t he euro area. Macro-economic 
condit ional it y of  t he Cohesion fund should be extended t o t he st ruct ural  funds. 
They should be t argeted at  improving compet it iveness and reduct ion of  imbalances 
in t he Member St at es receiving recommendat ions in t he excessive imbalance 
procedure. In programme count ries, t he European Commission should 
aut omat ical ly check t o ensure t hat  st ruct ural  and cohesion funds provide t he 
opt imum support  for t he macroeconomic adj ust ment  programme and be involved 
in t he select ion and implementat ion of  proj ect s. Wit hin t he European Commission, 
t he Commissioner for Economic and Financial  Af fairs, should play a decisive role in 
t his process. Funds not  used by programme count ries could be combined in a fund 
for growt h and compet it iveness administ rat ed on t he European level  by t he 
Commission. In t he fut ure, payment s f rom st ruct ural  and cohesion funds should be 
suspended in euro area count ries not  complying wit h recommendat ions under t he 
excessive def icit  procedure. These changes should be implement ed in t he new 
st ruct ural  and cohesion funds regulat ions t o be proposed for t he next  mult iannual 
f inancial  f ramework. 
2.2 EU Policy Priorities 
The Commission’s policy priorities over the short to medium terms were set out in its 
annual work programme published on 27 October 2010,8  building on the political priorities 
presented by Barroso in the first State of the Union Address in September 2010.9  
1. Restoring growth for jobs by accelerating towards 2020: strengthening economic 
governance and initiating the European Semester, completing financial regulation 
reform, progressing Europe 2020 delivery, and tapping the potential of the Single 
Market.  
2. Pursuing the citizens’ agenda: in the areas of freedom, security and justice.  
3. Europe in the World - pulling our weight on the global stage: a comprehensive 
trade policy, EU enlargement, neighbourhood development policies and 
humanitarian aid. 
4. From input to impact - making the most of EU policies: including a modern budget 
for Europe’s future and promoting smart regulation.  
                                                 
8  European Commission (2010) Commission Work Programme 2011, COM(2010) 623 final Vol.I, 
27.10.2010, Brussels. 
9 Barroso J.M (2010) St at e of  t he Union Address 2010, SPEECH/10/411, 7 September 2010, European 
Parliament, Brussels. The second State of the Union Address is scheduled for 28 September 2011.  
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Published in the wake of the Europe 2020 strategy,10 the Digital Europe Strategy,11 the Fifth 
Cohesion Report 12  and the Single Market Act, 13  the Commission’s work programme 
identifies a raft of legislative and non-legislative initiatives to be pursued over the 
following two years. The main initiatives noted in relation to Cohesion policy were the 
legislative reform package for the post-2013 period and the second strategic report for the 
current period.14 Also of relevance to Cohesion policy are the progression of the Europe 
2020, discussed in below, and the reform of the EU budget, examined in detail in Section 3. 
The Commission’s broad priorities were largely reflected in the 2011 European Council 
Presidency priorities of Hungary and, subsequently, Poland. An important development was 
the finalisation of accession negotiations with Croatia on 30 June 2011. The Accession 
Treaty will be signed in December 2011 enabling Croatia to join the EU on 1 July 2013 after 
the conclusion of the ratification process.  
2.3 PROGRESSING EUROPE 2020  
The Europe 2020 strategy is the EU’s overarching development strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth over the 2010-2020 period. Endorsed by the Council in 
June 2010, further progress over the last year includes the approval of the ‘Integrated 
Guidelines’ and ‘Flagship Initiatives’.  The first six guidelines (or Broad Guidelines for 
Economic Policies) establishing the Europe 2020 Strategy had already been approved by the 
Council on 13 July 2010, while the last four employment-related guidelines (6-10) were 
approved on 21 October 2010 following consultation with the Parliament (Box 1).15 These 
guidelines are central to the reform of Cohesion policy post-2013 as a sub-set will provide 
the strategic reference framework for future thematic priorities and, potentially, 
conditionalities.  
 
                                                 
10 European Commission (2010b) Communicat ion f rom t he Commission, Europe 2020 A st rat egy for 
smart , sust ainable and inclusive growt h, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, 3.3.2010. 
11 European Commission (2010) Digit al  Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245 final/2, 19.5.2010, Brussels 
12 European Commission (2010) Invest ing in Europe’ s Fut ure: Fif t h Report  on economic, social  and 
t errit orial  cohesion, Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg; European Commission 
(2010) Conclusions of  t he Fif t h Report  on Economic, Social  and Territ orial  Cohesion: The Fut ure of  
Cohesion Pol icy, COM(2010) 642 final, Brussels.  
13 European Commission (2010) Towards a Single Market  Act  For a highly compet it ive social  market  
economy: 50 proposals for improving our work, business and exchanges wit h one anot her, COM(2010) 
608 final/2, 11.11.2010, Brussels. Subsequently agreed as: European Commission (2011) Single Market  
Act : Twelve levers t o boost  growt h and st rengt hen conf idence: "Working t oget her t o creat e new 
growt h", COM(2011) 206 final, 13.4.2011, Brussels. 
14 European Commission (2010) Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Commission Work Programme 2011, COM(2010) 623 final, VOL. II, 27.10.2010, Brussels: 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/cwp2011_annex_en.pdf 
15  Council of the European Union (2010) Council Decision 2010/707/EU of 21 October 2010 on 
guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, Official Journal L 30, 24/11/2010, 
p0046 – 0051. 
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Box 1: Integrated Guidelines  
1. Ensuring the quality and the sustainability of public finances. 
2. Addressing macroeconomic imbalances. 
3. Reducing imbalances in the euro area. 
4. Optimising support for R&D and innovation, strengthening the knowledge triangle and 
unleashing the potential of the digital economy.  
5. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and using resources efficiently. 
6. Improving the business environment and modernising the industrial base. 
7. Increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing structural 
unemployment and promoting job quality. 
8. Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs and promoting lifelong 
learning. 
9. Improving the quality and performance of education and training systems at all levels 
and increasing participation in tertiary or equivalent education. 
10. Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty. 
 
As regards the flagship initiatives, the Commission had presented by the end of 2010 ‘A 
Digital Agenda for Europe’,16 ‘Youth on the Move’,17 ‘Innovation Union’,18 ‘An Industrial 
Policy for the Globalisation Era’,19 ‘An Agenda for New Skills and Jobs’20 and ‘A European 
Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion’.21 The final flagship initiative, ‘A Resource-
efficient Europe’, was presented in January 2011. 22  DG REGIO responded to these 
developments by issuing two Communications on ‘smart growth’ 23  and ‘sustainable 
growth’, 24 highlighting the contribution of Cohesion policy to Europe 2020 objectives and 
flagship initiatives as well as setting out a series of recommendations to increase their 
alignment further during the remainder of the 2007-13 period and beyond (Box 2 and Box 
3). 
                                                 
16 European Commission (2010) Digit al  Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245 final/2, 19.5.2010, Brussels 
17 European Commission (2010) Yout h on t he Move, COM(2010)477, 15.9.2010, Brussels 
18 European Commission (2010) Innovat ion Union, COM(2010)456, 6.10.2010, Brussels 
19  European Commission (2010) An indust rial  pol icy for t he global isat ion era, COM(2010) 614, 
27.10.2010, Brussels 
20 European Commission (2010) An agenda for new skil ls and j obs. A European Cont ribut ion t owards 
ful l  employment , COM(2010)682, 23.11.2010, Brussels 
21 European Commission (2010) A European Plat form against  Povert y and Social  Exclusion: A European 
Framework for Social  and Territ orial  Cohesion, COM(2010)758, 15.12.2010, Brussels 
22  European Commission (2011) A Resource-ef f icient  Europe, Brussels, COM(2011) 21, 26.1.2011, 
Brussels. 
23  European Commission (2010) Regional Pol icy cont ribut ing t o smart  growt h in Europe 2020, 
COM(2010) 553 final, Brussels. Brussels, 6.10.2010; European Commission (2010) Commission St af f  
Working Document  on Regional Pol icy cont ribut ing t o smart  growt h in Europe 2020, SEC(2010) 1183, 
Brussels. 
24 European Commission (2011) Regional  Pol icy Cont ribut ing t o Sust ainable Growt h in Europe 2020, 
COM(2011)17 Final, 26.1.2011, Brussels; European Commission (2011) Commission St af f  Working 
Document  of  Regional Pol icy cont ribut ing t o sust ainable growt h in Europe 2020, SEC(2011) 92 final, 
26.1.2011, Brussels. 
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Box 2: ‘Smart Growth’ Recommendations for Cohesion policy 
Member State Actions 
 
1. Developing smart specialisation strategies drawing on support for technical assistance and subjecting them to 
international peer review.  
 
2. Make more extensive use of financial engineering instruments in support of innovation 
 
3. Pursuing the possibility to finance interregional cooperation to promote research and innovation and better 
access to international research and innovation networks under FP7 and CIP. 
 
4. Ensuring coherence between supply push and demand pull research and innovation policy, by making use of the 
opportunities offered by public procurement co-financed by the ERDF to increase the innovation content of 
products, processes and services. 
 
5. Using international peer review by independent experts for research projects more systematically to enhance 
the effectiveness of support.  
 
6. Considering the use of the ERDF for financing suitable shortlisted FP7 and CIP projects. 
 
7. Exploiting the possibilities for improving regional innovation policy through peer learning: offered by FP7, CIP 
and INTERREG IV C platforms and networks.  
 
European Commission Actions 
 
1. Facilitate smart specialisation strategies by developing (a) a ’Smart Specialisation Platform’ to help identify 
needs, strengths and opportunities (b) data, policy analysis and information on research and innovation 
performance and specialisation from an EU-wide perspective (c) platforms for mutual learning  
 
2. Assist education, research and innovation projects through knowledge transfer and diffusion of good practice, 
with the help of the 'Regions for Economic Change' initiative and by providing technical support to innovation-
based Fast Track regional networks and to interregional collaboration supported  
 
3. Work with financial institutions to leverage funding and maximise the use of existing financial instruments, 
including by establishing a RSFF window/facility for Convergence regions, more intensive use of JEREMIE, as well 
as by examining ways of extending the scope of existing financial engineering instruments to new research and 
innovation activities. 
 
4. Facilitate business opportunities for SMEs' through consolidating and reinforcing the Enterprise Europe Network 
(EEN), the partners of which should, in turn, help organisations to make better use of ERDF financing for 
innovation. 
 
5. Improve the coherence and complementarity of EU policies for education, research and innovation, with the 
aim of: promoting the take-up of good practice; expanding and upgrading the 'Practical Guide on EU funding 
opportunities' and establishing a single web-based portal on Commission support for research and innovation linked 
to the FP7 Participant Portal. 
Box 3: ‘Sustainable Growth Recommendations for Cohesion policy’ 
Member State Actions 
 
1. To consider realigning expenditure to boost the transition to resource efficient and low-carbon economy and 
examine the need for OP modifications, drawing on complementary support offered by other EU policies as regards 
 
2. To ensure the systemic integration of the sustainability principles in each step of the project life-cycle with 
particular attention to increase resource efficiency 
 
3. To address climate change in their territorial planning, including local, regional and macroregional strategies 
involving supranational areas linked to sea or river basins in particular. 
 
4. To carry out specific evaluations and to include a dedicated section within OP Annual Implementation Reports 
assesssing support to the guidelines set out in the Communication; 
 
5. To consider the flexibility being offered within the Operational Programmes to reorient regional policy funding 
towards Europe 2020 priorities; 
 
6. To prepare for the next round of OPs in terms of: a greater thematic focus on green investment and a shift to a 
low carbon and climate resilient economy while ensuring an integrated approach to sustainable urban and/or rural 
development, and fully taking into account the territorial context and opportunities; capacity building, using 
technical assistance budgets, to involve local, regional and NGO actors in regional climate change adaptation and 
mitigation strategies. 
 
European Commission Actions 
 
1. Commit to swift consideration and support to any request for reprogramming for funding towards Europe 2020 
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priorities. 
 
2. Work with financial institutions to leverage resources and maximise the use of financial instruments (including 
JEREMIE and JESSICA), with a particular focus on sustainable energy in residential buildings to build on the recent 
amendments to Structural Funds regulations. 
 
3. Work with the Member States and regions to develop targeted pilot initiatives and seminars to deploy proposals 
outlined in the Communication. 
 
4. Assist national and regional authorities with thematic expertise in the implementation and monitoring of 
programmes. 
 
5. Mobilise the available resources in existing OPs to build up institutional capacity in order to ensure the 
application of the sustainable development principles, and unblock bottlenecks, especially with JASPERS. 
 
6. Assist Member States in mobilising the available Technical Assistance of their OPs for boosting regional 
sustainable growth and to facilitate at all administrative levels the project pipeline. 
 
7. Identify and encourage further exchange of good practice between Member States in areas related to 
sustainable growth through initiatives such as Regions for Economic Change or ESPON. 
 
The completion of the first ‘European Semester’ during 2011 is an important milestone 
in the economic governance component of the Europe 2020 strategy.  The central aim is to 
reinforce budgetary and structural policy coordination while major budgetary decisions are 
still under preparation. The key steps were as follows. 
x The Commission’s Annual Growth Survey initiated the first stage of the six-month 
cycle in January 2011, providing analysis of progress towards Europe 2020 targets, a 
macro-economic report and the joint employment report, and setting out an 
integrated approach to recovery and growth.  
x At the Spring Council in March 2011, Member States identified the main challenges 
facing the EU and gave strategic advice on policies, essentially endorsing the 
Commission’s growth survey.  
x Taking this guidance into account, the Member States presented and discussed their 
medium-term budgetary strategies through Stability and Convergence Programmes 
and, at the same time, drew up their 2011 National Reform Programmes. These 
documents were sent to the Commission in April and May 2011 for assessment.  
x Based on the Commission’s assessment, the European Council and Council of 
Ministers issued country-specific guidance in July 2011, before Member States 
finalised their budgets for the following year. 
As will be discussed later, the National Reform Programmes may take on increased strategic 
importance in Cohesion policy post-2013, particularly if the Commission’s proposals on 
macro-economic and structural conditionalities are approved by the Council and European 
Parliament. 
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3. A BUDGET FOR EUROPE 2020  
Following three years of informal consultation and debate under the Budget Review, the 
Commission presented its proposals on the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) 
2014-20 at the end of June 2011, marking the launch of the formal budgetary 
negotiations among the Member States in the Council and with the European Parliament.25 
In presenting the proposals, President Barroso dubbed them as being ambitious, innovative, 
responsible and rigorous at once, and stressed the focus on added value, contribution to 
Europe 2020, pan-European benefits, commitment to solidarity and simplification drive.26 
Member State negotiations are at an early stage, although key issues of contention are 
already clear from the informal and formal exchanges of views and statements, while the 
European Parliament had already approved its initial negotiating stance in May 2011.  
The following sections discuss these issues in more detail, beginning with a review of the 
Commission’s proposals, the first round of informal and formal reactions by Member States 
and then outlining the European Parliament’s stance. 
3.1 COMMISSION PROPOSALS ON THE 2014-2020 MFF 
The Commission’s legislative proposals and associated documents on the 2014-2020 
Multiannual Financial Framework were presented at the end of June 2011, including:  
x a Commission Communication on ‘A Budget for Europe 2020’ (in two parts);27  
x a Regulation adopting a new Multiannual Financial Framework;28  
x an Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) on budgetary matters and sound financial 
management;29  
x a Decision and two Regulations on own resources;30 and   
                                                 
25 For a review, see: Mendez C, Bachtler J and Wishlade F (2011) Setting the stage for the reform of 
Cohesion policy after 2013, European Pol icy Research Papers, No 77, European Policies Research 
Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow; Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2010) Challenges, 
Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for the Cohesion Policy Debate, European Pol icy Research 
Papers, No 74, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.  
26 José Manuel Barroso (2011) Remarks by President Barroso on the Commission's proposals for the 
2014-2020 Multi-Annual Financial Framework Press Conference, 29 June 2011, Brussels. 
27 European Commission (2011) Commission Communicat ion, A budget  for Europe 2020, SEC(2011)868, 
29.06.2011, Brussels. 
28  European Commission (2011) Proposal for a Council  Regulat ion laying down the multiannual 
financial framework for the years 2014-2020, Communication from the Commission, COM(2011)398, 
29.06.2011, Brussels 
29 European Commission (2011) Proposal for an Int erinst i t ut ional  Agreement  bet ween t he European 
Parl iament , t he Council  and t he Commission on cooperat ion in budget ary mat t ers and on sound 
f inancial  management , Communication from the Commission, COM(2011)403, 29.06.2011, Brussels 
30 European Commission (2011) Proposal for a Council  Decision on a syst em of  own resources for t he 
European Union, COM(2011)510, Brussels, 29.06.2011; European Commission (2011) Proposal for a 
Council  Regulat ion laying down implement ing measures for t he system of  own resources of  t he 
European Union, COM(2011) 511 final, Brussels; European Commission (2011) Proposal for a Counci l  
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x a series of staff working papers, one providing general background information on 
the challenges ahead and reform options, a second on the operation of the own 
resources system, and the third focusing on the added value of the EU budget.31 
The Commission envisages a total budget of €1,025 billion in commitment appropriations 
over the 2014-2020 period, compared to €993.6 billion (2011 prices) in the current period 
(Table 3.1). As a share of Gross National Income, commitments would fall from the current 
1.12 percent to 1.05 percent. However, this figure rises to 1.11 percent if items included 
outside the multi-annual framework are added, such as financial reserves to respond to 
crises and emergencies.32 In absolute terms, the commitments budget rises by 3.2 percent, 
or by around 5 percent if the ‘outside MFF’ items are included.  
Table 3.1: Budget shifts in 2014-2020 MFF Proposals for Commitment Appropriations 
€ billion 
(2011 prices) 
Change 
(in %) BUDGET HEADING 
2007-13 2014-20  
1. SMART AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 445.5 490.9 10.2 
Competitiveness 77.8 114.9 47.7 
Infrastructure 12.9 40.0 209.7 
Cohesion policy 354.8 336.0 -5.3 
2. SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: NATURAL RESOURCES 421.1 382.9 -9.1 
Market related expenditure and direct payments 322.0 281.8 -12.5 
3. SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP 12.4 18.5 49.9 
Freedom, security and justice 7.6 11.6 53.0 
Citizenship 4.8 6.9 44.9 
4. GLOBAL EUROPE 56.8 70.0 23.2 
5. ADMINISTRATION 56.9 62.6 10.1 
Administrative expenditure of EU institutions 48.4 50.5 4.2 
6. COMPENSATIONS 0.9   
TOTAL COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 993.6 1,025.0 3.2 
In % of EU27 GNI 1.12% 1.05%  
Source: Lewandowski (2011) A budget for Europe 2020, Presentation by Commissioner Lewandowski, 
29.06.2011, Brussels 
With respect to the components of the budget, the main headings have been repackaged 
to emphasise Europe 2020 objectives: 1) ‘Smart and inclusive growth’, comprise one 
heading (including cohesion and infrastructure together under a single ‘sub-ceiling’) 2) 
‘Sustainable growth’ (mainly the Common Agricultural Policy) 3) ‘Security and citizenship’, 
merging the two previous sub-headings into one budget heading 4) ‘Global Europe’ and 5) 
‘Administration’.  
                                                                                                                                            
Regulat ion on t he met hods and procedure for making available t he t radit ional  and GNI-based own 
resources and on t he measures t o meet  cash requirement s, COM(2011) 512 final, Brussels. 
31 European Commission (2011) Commission St af f  Working Paper on A Budget  for Europe 2020: t he 
current  syst em of  funding, t he chal lenges ahead, t he resul t s of  st akeholders consult at ion and 
dif ferent  opt ions on t he main horizont al  and sect oral  issues, Accompanying the document - 
Commission Communication, A budget for Europe 2020, SEC(2011)868, 29.06.2011, Brussels; European 
Commission (2011) Commission St af f  Working Paper on Financing t he EU Budget : Report  on t he 
operat ion of  t he own resources system, SEC(2011) 876 final, Accompanying the document Proposal for 
a Council Decision on the system of own resources of the European Union {COM(2011) 510 final}, 
29.6.2 011, Brussels; European Commission (2011) Commission St af f  Working Paper on The added 
value of  t he EU budget , Accompanying the document – Commission Communication, A budget for 
Europe 2020, SEC(2011)867, 29.06.2011, Brussels.  
32 The Commission proposes to include €58 billion outside the MFF, significantly more than the €40 
billion allocation in the previous period. 
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The main financial increases would be in three areas:  
x Infrastructure: would see a major increase of more than 200 percent to €40 billion 
under the new ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ for trans-European networks. Centrally 
managed by the TEN-T agency, this facility would fund pre-selected transport, energy 
and ICT priority infrastructures where there are market failures and insufficient national 
priority.33 The financing of projects would be supported by EU project bonds and closely 
linked to Cohesion Policy: the co-financing rates for projects would be higher in 
Convergence regions than in Competitiveness regions; and the Cohesion Fund would 
provide an additional €10 billion of funding for transport projects, particularly in the 
newer Member States. 
x R&D, innovation and education: would increase by 48 percent to €115 billion. Existing 
research and innovation instruments would be regrouped under a Common Strategic 
Framework (Horizon 2020), concentrating on three priorities: excellence in the science 
base; tackling societal challenges; and creating industrial leadership and boosting 
competitiveness. Complementary investments would be received from the Structural 
Funds (at least €60 billion, as at present). 
x Global Europe: including development aid, the instrument for pre-accession and the 
European neighbourhood would increase by 23 percent to €70 billion. The main increase 
would be in the Neighbourhood instrument, while the Development and Cooperation 
Instrument, including a new pan-African instrument, would maintain its current funding 
levels in order to enable the EU to achieve its commitment to allocate 0.7 percent of 
GNP to overseas development between 2011 and 2015. 
By contrast, the CAP and Cohesion policy would see their total allocations fall. Both would 
still remain the largest items of EU budgetary expenditure (see Table 3.1), with the 
Cohesion share overtaking that of agriculture for the first time.  
x Common Agricultural Policy expenditure would fall by around ten percent to €372 
billion. This would leave its overall share of the budget at 36.2 percent, compared to 
39.4 percent in 2007-13. However, it is necessary to add 15.2 billion earmarked for 
the agricultural sector under other budget headings (i.e. R&D within Horizon 2020 
(€4.5 billion), food safety under the ‘Security and Citizenship’ heading (€2.2 billion), 
food aid for the most deprived regions under ‘Smart and Inclusive Growth’ (€2.5 
billion), and, outside the MFF, aid from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
(€2.5 billion) and a new reserve for crises in the agriculture sector (€3.5 billion)). The 
two pillar structure is retained, with €281.8 billion earmarked for direct payments 
and market measures in support of farmers (Pillar 1), down from €289 billion in the 
current budget; and the rest (€89.9 billion) for rural development (Pillar 2), a 
decrease from €96 billion in 2007-13. Beyond these headline figures, the Commission 
proposes:  
                                                 
33 A preliminary list of the proposed infrastructures - the ‘missing links’ – is included in the ‘Policy 
Fiches’ (Part II) document accompanying the Communication. 
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o the ‘greening’ of 30 percent of direct payments; 
o Convergence of direct support per hectare to ensure a more equal distribution of 
direct payments; 
o revised allocation of rural development funds on the basis of more objective 
criteria and better targeted to the objectives of the policy; and 
o capping of direct payments to large agricultural holdings. 
x Cohesion policy funding would fall by some five percent, from €354.8 billion to €336 
billion. This equates to a 36.7 percent share of the 2014-2020 MFF, as compared to 
35 percent in the previous period. The distribution of funding would be as follows:  
o Convergence regions (€162.6 billion): eligibility remaining at GDP per capita 
below 75 percent of the EU average;  
o Transit ion regions (€38.9 billion): a new category to replace the phasing-in/out 
arrangements, which also includes regions with GDP per capita between 75 
percent and 90 percent which have not previously had Convergence status; 
o Compet it iveness regions (€53.1 billion): for the remaining regions with GDP per 
capita above 90 percent of the EU average; 
o Territ orial  cooperat ion (€11.7 billion): under the current three strands of cross-
border, transnational and interregional cooperation; 
o Cohesion Fund (€68.7 billion): for Member States with GNI per capita below 90 
percent of the EU average; and  
o An ext ra al locat ion for out ermost  and sparsely populat ed regions (€926 million). 
As noted, the Cohesion budget sub-heading also includes €40 billion for the ‘Connecting 
Europe facility’. A further €10 billion would be earmarked for this new facility under the 
Cohesion Fund. Within Cohesion policy, the financial split between funds would also 
change. An increase in the relative share of the ESF is proposed, which would represent at 
least 25 percent of the cohesion envelope (or €84 billion), with different thresholds 
depending on the category of region (25 percent for Convergence/40 percent for 
Transition/52 percent for Competitiveness), not taking into account the Connecting Europe 
facility.  
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Figure 3.1: Multi-Annual Financial Framework Commitment Appropriations (€ billions) 
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On the income side of the budget, the Commission proposes two new own resources, a 
Financial Transaction Tax and an EU VAT component in order to render the financing of the 
EU more transparent and fair; and proposes to simplify the system of corrections and 
rebates by replacing these by a system of fixed annual lump sums. 
x The resource based on the harmonized VAT base would be replaced with a VAT resource 
and a financial transaction tax. According to Commission estimates, the two new own 
sources of income could generate 18.1 percent and 22.7 percent of the EU’s own 
resources in 2020. It also proposes to lower the 25 percent share of traditional own 
resources (agricultural levies and customs) retained by Member States to ten percent.  
x All current corrections and rebates would be abolished giving way to a simpler system 
based on a comparison of the budgetary burden and the relative prosperity of each 
Member State. Compensation would be in the form of a gross annual reduction in 
national contributions based on gross national product (GNP). The Commission considers 
that Germany (€2,500 million), Sweden (€350 million), Netherlands (€1,050 million) and 
the United Kingdom (€3,600 million) should be eligible for annual gross reductions in 
their GNP contributions. All members would contribute to the financing of gross 
reductions for the four countries according to their GDP share.  
As regards financial programming and management, the duration of the MFF would be 
seven years (2014-2020) to tie in with the Europe 2020 targets, with a mid-term review 
foreseen in 2016. More flexibility within and across budgetary headings is proposed to 
enable new challenges to be addressed and to facilitate the decision-making process. As 
noted, five instruments would be included outside the financial framework (the Emergency 
Aid Reserve, the Flexibility Instrument, the Solidarity Fund and the Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund, and a new instrument to react to crisis situations in agriculture), as 
would the ITER (fusion reactor) and GMES (environment monitoring programme) projects 
due to the difficulty in funding large-scale projects through the EU budget and their low 
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predictability. Greater use of ‘delegated acts’ would provide further management 
flexibility in the use of instruments. Lastly, more stringent rules for financial planning and 
management of EU funded programmes will be proposed, particularly for the Structural 
Funds. 
Under its simplification agenda, the Commission stresses the need for cost-effective 
implementation and control rules. To this end, a Communication on simplification will be 
issued at the end of 2011 once all of the Commission’s sector specific proposals have been 
tabled. The main proposals in the Budget 2020 Communication include the following. 
x Reducing the number of programmes: Complex programmes which have not been 
successful will either be redesigned in a simplified and more effective form or 
discontinued (notably in maritime affairs and fisheries, justice and fundamental rights, 
home affairs, education and culture). 
x Single strategic frameworks with common rules: for instance, by bringing together the 
three main sources of funding for research and innovation (FP7, the innovation part of 
the competitiveness and innovation programme and the European Institute of Innovation 
and Technology) within a single Common Strategic Framework, as is also the case for the 
shared management funds (the ERDF, the ESF, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the future European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund) under EU Cohesion policy.  
x Externalisation: more extensive use of existing agencies, particularly for smaller 
programmes that have not yet been externalised and which involve a critical mass of 
homogenous or standardised operations (e.g. education and culture programmes). 
x Mainstreaming priorities across policies: Climate action and environment objectives 
need to be reflected in all relevant instruments. The relevant share of the EU budget 
will increase as a result of effective mainstreaming in all major EU policies (such as 
cohesion, research and innovation, agriculture and external cooperation).  
x More efficient administration: through simplification and rationalisation, including a 
five percent reduction in staffing levels and changes to staff regulations (e.g. to 
increase working hours without compensatory wage adjustments and to increase the 
pension age). 
The planned timing of the legislative process anticipates the negotiations to last at least 
until the end of 2012 under the Cypriot Presidency, paving the way for the adoption of the 
legal bases in 2013 and the implementation of the new MFF from 1 January 2014 onwards. 
3.2 Member State reactions 
Negotiations on the future MFF are at an early stage, the Commission’s proposals being first 
presented and discussed at an informal ministerial meeting of EU Affairs Ministers on 29 
June 2011 in Poland, followed by a first formal exchange of views at the General Affairs 
Council meeting in Brussels on 12 September 2011. The focus of the Polish Presidency work 
during the remainder of 2011 is on gaining a better understanding of the Commission’s 
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proposals and Member State positions, particularly through technical meetings under the 
Friends of the Presidency group, to provide a basis for the subsequent Presidencies to 
oversee negotiations and achieve a compromise agreement with the European Parliament. 
Initial reactions to the Commission’s proposals by some net contributors were 
unsurprisingly negative (e.g. France, Germany, UK). A British cabinet spokesman criticised 
them as being “unrealistic”, 34  while the German Foreign Minister considered the total 
budget proposed to be “irresponsibly high”.35 France issued a more detailed statement, 
also opposing the proposed spending levels, but placing particular emphasis on the need to 
retain the CAP in its current form (Box 4).  
Back in December 2010, these countries along with Finland and the Netherlands had signed 
a letter calling for budgetary restraint, including: progressive limits to growth in payments 
to the EU budget in 2012 and 2013; payments over the next MFF to grow by no more than 
inflation and commitments at a level consistent with stabilisation of budgetary 
contributions of Member States; and commitments to not exceed the 2013 level and grow 
below the rate of inflation.  
In response, a letter signed by 12 (current) ‘net beneficiary’ countries (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain) stressed the need to use the EU budget as an instrument to support an exit 
from the crisis, bolstering EU competitiveness and strengthening internal cohesion. 36  
Though a common stance was not adopted on the size of the budget, not least because 
Spain will no longer be a net beneficiary,37 a particular emphasis was placed on the need 
for “an ambitious Cohesion policy” with a share in the EU budget “of at least its present 
level”. On the issue of geographical eligibility and allocations, an all-region approach is 
supported concentrating on the less-developed regions as at present, while finding a 
transitional solution for phasing-out regions leaving the Convergence objective.  
More generally, the letter called for the continuation of funding under current budgetary 
instruments for climate change, energy efficiency and security, biodiversity, integration of 
migrants and democratic changes. Increased funds were requested for policies under the 
current Heading 3 (freedom, security and justice), particularly in relation to migratory 
flows and integrated border management. 
                                                 
34 Brand C (2011) Member states asked to clarify spending positions, 20.07.2011, European Voice; 
Euractiv.com (2011) Barroso tables €1 trillion budget for EU until 2020, Euract iv.com,  30 June 2011, 
Brussels.  
35 The Local (2011) ‘Germany blasts proposed EU budget’ 30 June 2011, www.thelocal.de.  
36 Sebag G (2011) Twelve member states defend share of cohesion policy, Europol it ics, 30.5.2011, 
Brussels. 
37 Spain will join the ‘net contributors’ for the first time in the next period and the government has 
stated that it wants to see domestic fiscal consolidation efforts reflected in the future EU Budget: 
Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales (2011) Comparecencia del Secretario General de 
Presupuestos y Gastos Espadas Moncalvillo para informar en relación con la materia objeto de estudio 
de la Ponencia sobre la revisión de las perspectivas financieras, la reforma del sistema de recursos 
propios, y la reforma de las políticas de cohesión y agraria común, constituida en el seno de la 
Comisión,  Comisiones Mixtas para la Unión Europea, Año 2011 IX Legislatura Núm. 192, Sesión núm. 
68, 3.5 2011, Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados, Madrid. 
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Box 4: France’s reactions to the EC’s MFF proposals38 
 
1. Stabilisation of the CAP budget and the common fisheries policy in current Euros is an important 
achievement. The CAP will remain the leading policy area of the European Union. France will accept 
no financial framework that does not guarantee such a stabilisation. Further points to stress are that: 
x the creation of a reserve to cover crises in the agricultural sector, which must be responsive, 
supplements the first pillar regulation instruments needed for farmers income stabilisation to cope 
with price volatility;  
x the budget choice made by the Commission will limit the potential for undertaking a certain 
redistribution of direct payments between Member States and their “greening”; and 
x the extension to farmers of the Globalisation Adjustment Fund should not prejudge current and 
future trade negotiations and France reiterates that it will refuse any trade agreement that may 
jeopardise European agricultural interests. 
2. Against the backdrop of very strong European and national budgetary constraints, France regrets 
that the Commission is not proposing to apply the same fiscal discipline and reform effort to the other 
policies that it is proposing for the CAP. France will strive to correct this in the upcoming negotiations 
because time has come for better spending instead of more spending. The EU must share the effort 
made by Member States to achieve budgetary discipline. 
x as regards Cohesion policy, the Commission has not fully taken account of the fact that some 20 
regions have achieved a level of development making them no longer eligible under the 
convergence objective: savings are possible; 
x the sharp increase in funds earmarked for “Competitiveness” regions is unacceptable at a time 
when the implementation and the effectiveness of such funds are questioned and when the Heads 
of State and Government have clearly called for in-depth reform: an increase in the budget for 
this policy - especially to this extent - before having reformed it in depth is not and option. 
3. France has continuously called attention to the need to stabilise its contribution to the EU budget. 
The Commission’s proposal does not meet this objective. The French national budget, which is 
already devoting nearly €20 billion to the EU budget, cannot accommodate the nearly €250 billion 
(i.e. almost 30%) increase in payments proposed by the Commission for the coming period. France 
calls for annual payment appropriation ceilings to be set at a realistic level and to cover all European 
expenditure (including large-scale projects such as ITER and GMES) in order to constitute a genuine 
cap on their increase. 
4. With regard to own resources, France has always opposed rebates and cannot consider continuing 
them. No extension is possible. What is required is more simplicity, transparency and fairness. The 
Commission suggests the creation of new own resources. France is open to discussion on this idea, on 
the condition that these resources would fully substitute for existing resources and that it would thus 
reduce contributions paid out of national budgets. The type of own resource to be selected should be 
carefully examined. France is willing to explore some of the solutions put forward by the Commission, 
particularly the idea of a levy on a European share of an international Financial Transaction Tax.  
With respect to the distribution to be determined in line with overall spending control, the EU should 
have the appropriate level of resources to cover its external action, particularly with regard to its 
neighbourhood policy. 
 
More recently, the General Affairs Council met in September 2011 to hold the first formal 
exchange of views on the duration, structure and flexibility of the next MFF on the basis of 
a questionnaire sent out by the Polish Presidency. The overall size of the MFF was not on 
the agenda, but eight net contributors met ahead of the meeting at the initiative of 
                                                 
38 Propositions de la Commission européenne pour le cadre financier de l’Union européenne 2014-
2020, Communiqué du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, du ministère du Budget, des 
Comptes publics et de la Réforme de l’État et du ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Alimentation, de la 
Pêche, de la Ruralité et de l’Aménagement du Territoire, 30 June 2011, Paris: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/article_imprim.php3?id_article=93753 
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Sweden to agree a common position on spending restraint in opposition to the 
Commission’s proposals.39 The non-paper was signed by Austria, Germany, Finland, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, stating that:40 
“ The Commission’ s proposal for t he next  Mult i-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) 
2014-2020 comes at  a t ime Member St at es are making considerable f inancial 
ef fort s t o support  Europe and at  t he same t ime are undertaking t ough 
consol idat ion ef fort s. European publ ic spending cannot  be exempt  f rom t hese 
considerable nat ional ef fort s. 
The Commission proposal is t oo high. The increases of  spending over t he next  MFF 
are signif icant ly in excess of  what  is needed for a st abil isat ion of  t he European 
budget . The new MFF should not  lead t o an increase in nat ional  cont ribut ions t o 
t he EU budget . Accordingly, t ot al  spending for t he 2014-2020 period needs t o be 
subst ant ial ly lower in order t o meet  t hese crit eria. 
At  t he same t ime, t he MFF should cover al l  spending in a complet e and t ransparent  
way. 
We need t o make t he best  use of  t he European budget  t o create bet t er condit ions 
for growt h and make Europe more compet it ive. We need t o spend bet t er, not  t o 
spend more.”  
Specific figures are not mentioned in the non-paper, although the German Minister is 
reported to have called for a reduction in the order of €100-120 billion in commitments 
during the lunch discussions following the General Affairs meeting.41 Denmark was not a 
signatory to the non-paper, perhaps because the government’s attention was on the general 
election of 15 September 2011 or reflecting its imminent EU Presidency role, but earlier in 
the year, it was reported that Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen had written to 
Commission President Barroso calling for a rebate in Denmark’s budgetary contribution to 
the value of €940m (7bn Danish kronor).42 
As regards the issues on the agenda of the Council meeting, the discussions revealed 
consensus on the proposed duration of the MFF and the need for flexibility, although 
mixed views were apparent on the structure of budget, particularly in relation to 
Cohesion policy, and the inclusion of certain items outside of the MFF.43 For instance, 
                                                 
39 Sebag G (2011) Eight net contributors say Commission proposal “too high”, 12.9.2011, Europol it ics, 
Brussels; Taylor S (2011) Call for lower budget for 2014-20, 12.9.2011, European Voice, Brussels.  
40  FCO (2011) ‘We need to spend better, not to spend more’ FCO News, 12.9.2011, Foreign 
Commonwealth Office, London: http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-
news/?view=PressS&id=654555082. 
41 Sebag G (2011) Eight net contributors say Commission proposal “too high”, 12.9.2011, Europol it ics, 
Brussels. 
42  Danmark kræver EU-rabat på syv mia, Berl ingske, 16 May 2011.  
ht t p:/ / www.b.dk/ nat ional t / danmark-kraever-eu-rabat -paa-syv-mia 
43  Council of the European Union (2011) 3109th General  Af fairs Council  meet ing, Press release 
13587/11, 12.9.2011, Brussels. 
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opposition was expressed against the proposed merger of the current sub-headings 1a and 
1b into a single heading 1 (‘smart and inclusive growth’) and on the creation under the new 
heading 1 of a sub-ceiling for expenditure on cohesion. Some Ministers considered that a 
separate sub-heading should be maintained for Cohesion policy and called for guarantees 
that cohesion expenditure would not be undermined by the proposed structure. Related 
concerns were raised about the link between cohesion expenditure and the proposed 
Connecting Europe Facility.  
The proposal to include instruments outside the financial framework (such as a new reserve 
fund for crises in the agricultural sector or the ITER project, the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) is also contentious. This was implicit in the letter of 
the eight net contributors, which stated that “t he MFF should cover al l  spending in a 
complet e and t ransparent  way” , and explicit in the French government reactions (Box 4). 
3.3 The European Parliament’s position 
The European Parliament’s formal position was adopted prior to the publication of the 
Commission’s proposals, at the plenary of 8 June 2011, following an intense year of work by 
its ‘Policy Challenges’ (SURE) Committee.44 Containing no fewer than 176 paragraphs, the 
key messages of the resolution can be summarised as follows. 
x Total budget: If all the objectives and policies agreed for the EU are to be 
completed, a minimum increase of five percent is needed compared to the 2013 
budget. Freezing the budget at the 2013 level “is not a viable option”. An increase of 
at least five percent over the 2013 level would mean that the EU budget would be 
roughly 1.11 percent of the EU's total GNI, compared to the 1.06 percent expected 
for 2013. 
x Structure: the MFF should be structured into three main budget headings: (1) Europe 
2020, including subheadings ‘Knowledge for growth’ (1a), ‘Cohesion for growth and 
employment’ (1b), ‘Management of natural resources and sustainable development’ 
(including agriculture, 1c), ‘Citizenship, freedom, security and justice’ (1d); (2) 
Global Europe; and (3) Administration. 
x Policies: Cohesion policy and CAP spending should remain at current levels. 
x Own resources: A system of “real” own resources would be “fairer, more 
transparent, simpler and equitable”. Budget reform need not affect the size of the 
budget and would not increase the overall tax burden on citizens. An end to rebates, 
exceptions and correction mechanisms is called for. 
                                                 
44 European Parliament (2011) European Parl iament  resolut ion of  8 June 2011 on Invest ing in t he 
fut ure: a new Mult iannual Financial  Framework (MFF) for a compet it ive, sust ainable and inclusive 
Europe (2010/2211(INI)), Brussels. 
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x Flexibility: a “global MFF margin” should be created, consisting of unused margins, 
de-committed and unused appropriations from the previous year to allow new, 
unexpected expenditure to be accommodated. 
x Timing: a seven-year cycle is proposed, to be followed by five-year-cycles or 5+5-
year cycles in the next period to bring the MFF’s duration into line with the European 
Parliament’s five-year mandates. If budget cycles are to exceed five years, then the 
EU should have a mandatory mid-term review, with a fixed date.  
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4. COHESION POLICY 2014+: ELIGIBILITY AND ALLOCATIONS 
SCENARIOS 
A critical factor influencing Member State positions on the future EU budget and Cohesion 
policy is the issue of their eligibility under the different Cohesion policy objectives; this in 
turn determines the funding that will flow to different countries and regions. This section 
explores future eligibility and allocation scenarios under EU Cohesion policy on the basis of 
the latest statistical data. It begins with a brief overview of the current (2007-13) position 
in order to highlight the scale of the differences brought about by statistical changes since 
then and in the Commission’s recent budgetary proposals. 
4.1 Current position: 2007-13 Criteria and coverage 
4.1.1 Policy architecture 
The architecture of Cohesion policy in 2007-13 is set out in the general Regulation on the 
Structural Funds.45 It distinguishes three objectives: 
x Convergence, which aims at “speeding up the convergence of the least-developed 
Member States and regions” and which is considered the “priority of the funds”;46 
the Convergence objective is financed by the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) the European Social fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. 
x Regional compet it iveness and employment , which aims at “strengthening regions’ 
competitiveness and attractiveness as well as employment by anticipating economic 
and social change”;47the Competitiveness and Employment objective is financed by 
the ERDF and the ESF. 
x European t erri t orial  cooperat ion, which aims at “strengthening cross-border 
cooperation… …. transnational cooperation… …and interterritorial cooperation”;48 
the Territorial cooperation objective is financed by the ERDF. 
The overall resources available to Cohesion policy for 2007-13 are €308,041 million (2004 
prices).49 This sum yields the annual allocations set out in Table 4.1. 
 
 
                                                 
45  Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, OJEU No L 210 of 31 July 2006. 
46 Article 3.2(a) of the General Regulation. 
47 Article 3.2(b). 
48 Article 3.2(c). 
49 Article 18. 
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Table 4.1: Commitment appropriations for 2007-13 (€m, 2004 prices) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
42,863 43,318 43,862 43,860 44,073 44,723 45,342 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, Annex I. 
Within the Regulation this is broken down between the objectives as set out in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Commitment appropriations by objective 2007-13 
 € m (2004 prices) % of objective % of total 
Convergence    
 Regional convergence 177083.6 70.5 57.5 
 Phasing-out 12521.3 5.0 4.1 
 Cohesion Fund 61558.2 24.5 20.0 
 Total 251163.1 100.0 81.5 
Competitiveness & Employment    
 C&E regions 38742.5 78.9 12.6 
 Phase-in 10385.3 21.1 3.4 
 Total 49127.8 100.0 15.9 
Territorial cooperation    
 Cross-border 5576.4 72.0 1.8 
 Transnational  1581.7 20.4 0.5 
 Interregional 392.0 5.1 0.1 
 PEACE 200.0 2.6 0.1 
 Total 7750.1 100.0 2.5 
TOTAL 308041.0  100.0 
Source: General Regulation Articles 81 to 21 and Annex II para 22. 
Cohesion policy distinguishes between eligibility for the Cohesion Fund, which is 
determined at the nat ional  level, and eligibility for the various strands of policy 
determined at the regional  level.  
4.1.2 Cohesion Fund 
Eligibility for the Cohesion Fund is restricted to Member States where gross national 
income (GNI) per head measured in PPS is less than 90 percent of the EU 25 average for the 
period 2001-3 (see Table 4.3). Recipients of the Cohesion Fund in 2000-6 were Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. Ireland ceased to be eligible at the end of 2003, following a mid-term 
review. For 2007-13, Spain successfully made a case that special arrangements should apply 
to Member States subject to the ‘statistical effect’ of enlargement on the threshold for the 
Cohesion Fund and benefits from a special allocation. 
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Table 4.3: Member States eligible for the Cohesion Fund 2007-13 
Eligible  GNI(PPS) per head 
EU25=100 
 Ineligible  GNI(PPS) per head 
EU25=100 
Latvia 39.5  Germany  108.7 
Lithuania 42.4  Italy 108.7 
Estonia 44.4  Ireland 110.8 
Poland 45.5  Finland 113.6 
Slovakia 51.1  France 114.0 
Hungary 55.7  Sweden 115.6 
Czech Rep 64.9  UK 119.6 
Malta 73.5  Belgium 120.2 
Portugal 75.2  Austria 121.1 
Slovenia 75.7  Netherlands 121.5 
Greece 77.9  Denmark 122.9 
Cyprus 82.5  Luxembourg 195.3 
Spain 94.1    
Note: (i) Although Spain is over the qualifying threshold, it is eligible for special transitional 
arrangements under the Cohesion Fund; (ii) Bulgaria and Romania also qualified for the Cohesion 
Fund; (iii) Based on 2001-3 data. 
Source: Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013, Fiche No. 57 rev 2. 
4.1.3 Structural Funds 
Eligibility in 2007-13 for the regional ly-based elements of Cohesion policy is illustrated in 
Map 4.1. As is well-known, four categories of assisted area can be distinguished: 
x Convergence: those regions where GDP(PPS) per head for 2000-2 was less than 75 
percent of the EU25 average; 
x Phasing-out: those regions squeezed out of eligibility for Convergence status as a 
consequence of the statistical effect of enlargement, these being regions where 
GDP(PPS) per head was between 75 percent of the EU15 average and 75 percent of 
the EU25 average; 
x Phasing-in: former Objective 1 regions which had outgrown even Phasing-out region 
status; 
x Regional competitiveness and employment: the remaining territory of the EU. 
It is important to note that while Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007, 
the averages used for 2007-13 were for EU25, not EU27. 
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Map 4.1: Structural Funds eligibility 2007-13 
Structural Funds 2007-13
GDP 2000-2
Convergence   (80)
Phasing-out   (16)
Phasing-in   (13)
RCE   (153)
 
Source: Own elaboration after DG Regio. 
(i) Convergence regions 
As Table 4.4 shows, Convergence regions are heavily concentrated in central and eastern 
Europe and the Baltic states, covering the entire territories of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, as well as most of Hungary and the Czech 
and Slovak Republics (the capital city regions of these countries being excluded). Most of 
Portugal is also covered (Lisbon region excluded) together with around one-third of Italy, 
Greece and Spain, most of eastern Germany, and small parts of the UK.  
Overall, the EU15 account for just over one-third of total convergence coverage. However, 
around half of the EU27 total is within three countries – Italy, Poland and Romania. 
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Table 4.4: Convergence region coverage 2007-13 
 Population % of population Share of population 
EU27 153721.2 31.7 100.0 
EU25  124049.2 27.3 80.7 
EU15  55095.2 14.5 35.8 
Bulgaria 7868.9 100.0 5.1 
Czech Republic 9042.0 88.6 5.9 
Germany  10327.8 12.5 6.7 
Estonia 1361.2 100.0 0.9 
Greece 4026.3 36.6 2.6 
Spain 12882.8 31.8 8.4 
France 1748.9 2.9 1.1 
Italy 16712.3 29.2 10.9 
Latvia 2338.6 100.0 1.5 
Lithuania 3469.0 100.0 2.3 
Hungary 7331.7 72.2 4.8 
Malta 395.9 100.0 0.3 
Poland 38230.0 100.0 24.9 
Portugal 7032.2 67.8 4.6 
Romania 21803.1 100.0 14.2 
Slovenia 1995.0 100.0 1.3 
Slovakia 4790.6 88.9 3.1 
United Kingdom 2364.9 4.0 1.5 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
(i i) Phasing-out  regions 
Coverage of Phasing-out regions is not significant at the EU27 level, covering just 3.4 
percent of the EU population. Moreover, Phasing-out only concerns eight countries – all 
within the EU15 (see Table 4.5). Nevertheless, coverage is particularly significant in 
Greece, where over half the population falls into this category. Germany, Greece and Spain 
together account for over 80 percent of Phasing-out coverage. 
Table 4.5: Phasing-out region coverage, 2007-13 
 Eligible regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  16395.4 3.4 100.0 
EU25   16395.4 3.6 100.0 
EU15   16395.4 4.3 100.0 
Belgium Hainaut 1281.0 12.4 7.8 
Germany  
Brandenburg-Südwest 
Lüneberg 
Leipzig 
Halle 
5030.4 6.1 30.7 
Greece 
Kentriki Makedonia 
Dytiki Makedonia 
Attiki 
6100.1 55.5 37.2 
Spain 
Asturias 
Murcia 
Ceuta 
Melilla 
2346.2 5.8 14.3 
Italy Basilicata 597.1 1.0 3.6 
Austria Burgenland 278.3 3.4 1.7 
Portugal Algarve 394.6 3.8 2.4 
UK Highlands & Islands 367.6 0.6 2.2 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data 
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(i i i) Phasing-in regions 
Coverage of Phasing-in regions is also modest at the EU27 level, covering just 3.9 percent 
of the population (see Table 4.6). However, coverage is particularly significant in Cyprus 
(where the whole country is eligible), Hungary, Ireland and Spain. Spain alone accounts for 
approaching half of the total Phasing-in population. 
Table 4.6: Phasing-in region coverage, 2007-13 
 Eligible regions Population % of population Share of population 
EU27  19000.3 3.9 100.0 
EU25   19000.3 4.2 100.0 
EU15   15458.3 4.1 81.4 
Greece Sterea Ellada 
Notio Aigaio 
861.1 7.8 4.5 
Spain 
Castilla y León 
Valencia 
Canarias 
8376.6 20.7 44.1 
Ireland Border, Midlands, West 1040.6 26.5 5.5 
Italy Sardegna 1634.2 2.9 8.6 
Cyprus Entire country 715.1 100.0 3.8 
Hungary Közép-Magyarország 2826.9 27.8 14.9 
Portugal Madeira 240.8 2.3 1.3 
Finland Itä-Suomi 674.5 13.0 3.6 
UK Merseyside 
South Yorkshire 
2630.4 4.4 13.8 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data 
(iv) Regional Compet it iveness and Employment  (RCE) Regions 
The Regional Competitiveness & Employment (RCE) strand covers all regions that do not 
have Convergence, Phasing-out or Phasing-in status. This covers over 60 percent of the EU 
population, but is heavily concentrated in the EU15 – notably Germany, France and the UK, 
which together account for over 60 percent of the RCE population.  
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Table 4.7: RCE region coverage, 2007-13 
 Population % of population Share of population 
EU27 295255.3 60.9 100.0 
EU25  295255.3 64.9 100.0 
EU15  293496.1 77.1 99.4 
Belgium 9049.0 87.6 3.1 
Czech Republic 1158.8 11.4 0.4 
Denmark 5376.0 100.0 1.8 
Germany  67123.7 81.4 22.7 
Spain 16940.7 41.8 5.7 
France 59487.8 97.1 20.1 
Ireland 2885.6 73.5 1.0 
Italy 38213.4 66.9 12.9 
Luxembourg 446.2 100.0 0.2 
Netherlands 16147.0 100.0 5.5 
Austria 7805.5 96.6 2.6 
Portugal 2700.7 26.0 0.9 
Slovakia 600.4 11.1 0.2 
Finland 4526.5 87.0 1.5 
Sweden 8925.0 100.0 3.0 
United Kingdom 53869.0 90.9 18.2 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
4.2 2014+ Criteria and coverage 
Some important indications were given about future eligibility criteria for the Structural 
Funds in the Commission’s budget proposals published on 29 June 2011. 50  Of particular 
note: 
x the definition of Convergence regions would remain unchanged, save for being 
based on the EU27, rather than the EU25 average; 
x the current Phasing-out and Phasing-in categories would be abolished; 
x a new Transition category would be established, comprising: 
o regions with Convergence status in 2007-13, but where GDP has grown to 
more than 75 percent of the EU27 average; 
o all regions where GDP(PPS) per head is between 75 percent and 90 percent 
of the EU27 average; 
x the eligibility criterion for the Cohesion Fund would remain the same, except that 
it would be based on the EU27 rather than the EU25 average. 
                                                 
50 European Commission (2011) A budget  for Europe 2020, COM(2011)500 final of 29 June 2011. 
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4.2.1 Stat ist ical data 
In principle, the key criteria for determining eligibility for the Convergence objective will 
be:51 
x GNI(PPS) per head 2008-10 
x National GDP(PPS) per head 2007-9 
x Regional GDP(PPS) per head 2007-9 
Of these, regional GDP(PPS) per head data are currently only available for 2007-8. 
However, neither 2007-8 nor 2008 are capable of reflecting accurately the likely outcome 
for 2007-9. This is essentially because the recession began and ended at different times in 
the different Member States, with the result that, in relation to EU27 average GDP(PPS) per 
head, some countries are on an upward trend over 2007-9, some are on a downward trend 
and for some 2008 is a ‘peak’ year. In consequence, for the purposes of this report, 
estimates of regional GDP(PPS) per head for 2009 have been made in order more accurately 
to reflect likely outcomes for 2007-9. For this and other reasons, not least the inconsistency 
of some of the data currently available from Eurostat and the absence of complete 
information on the allocation methodologies for 2007-13, the outcomes presented here 
should be treated with caution. 
4.2.2 Cohesion Fund 
Eligibility for the Cohesion Fund on the basis of 2008-10 GNI data52 is illustrated in Table 
4.8. The main change in relation to the current position is that, in principle, Cyprus would 
cease to be eligible for the Cohesion Fund. However, Cyprus would be certain to benefit 
from some transitional arrangements, precedents for which were set when Ireland and 
Spain ceased to qualify. The scale and nature of such arrangements would, as in the past, 
be the subject of negotiation.  
                                                 
51 Unemployment rates are also used for calculating a very small proportion of the Convergence region 
allocation, but this is not considered further in this paper, and this element has not been used in the 
supporting calculations. 
52 In principle, as indicated above, this is the data that would determine eligibility for the Cohesion 
Fund from 2014, though they may be subject to revision.  
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Table 4.8: Eligibility for the Cohesion Fund 2014+? (GNI(PPS) per head 2008-10) 
Eligible GNI(PPS) per head EU27=100  Ineligible 
GNI(PPS) per 
head EU27=100 
Bulgaria 42.6  Cyprus 94.6 
Romania 45.3  Spain 100.8 
Latvia 54.8  Italy 102.4 
Lithuania 56.6  Ireland 107.5 
Poland 58.0  France 108.7 
Hungary 61.4  United Kingdom 115.4 
Estonia 63.0  Finland 116.8 
Slovakia 72.5  Belgium 117.5 
Malta 76.2  Germany 119.2 
Portugal 76.7  Austria 123.6 
Czech Republic 77.2  Denmark 124.0 
Slovenia 87.3  Sweden 125.0 
Greece 89.5  Netherlands 130.2 
   Luxembourg 199.1 
Source: Own calculations from AMECO online data. 
4.2.3 Structural Funds 
Coverage of eligible areas determined at the regional level for the post-2014 period is 
illustrated in Map 4.3. As mentioned above, this is based on published GDP(PPS) per head 
data for 2007-8 and an estimate of regional GDP(PPS) per head for 2009; 2009 data are due 
for release by Eurostat in February 2012. Map 4.3 takes account of the Budget 2020 
proposals, distinguishing the new categories of transitional area. 
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Map 4.2: Structural Fund areas 2014+ under the Budget 2020 proposals 
Structural Funds 2014+?
GDP(PPS) per head 2007-9 (est)
Convergence   (62)
Transitional (former Convergence)   (18)
Transitional (GDP>75%<90% EU27)   (37)
RCE   (150)
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data.  
Compared with Map 4.1, Map 4.2 shows a very different pattern of area designation. In 
particular: 
x Convergence coverage is reduced; and 
x the new Transition category comprises areas which have never had Convergence 
status, notably in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. 
It should be noted in passing that caution is necessary in considering the number of eligible 
regions in the two maps – these are not directly comparable owing to changes in NUTS 2 
boundaries in a number countries. 
It is also interesting to note what the situation would have been had the existing approach 
been rolled forward. This is illustrated in Map 4.3. This shows that while the coverage of 
the Convergence regions obviously remains the same under the two approaches, the impact 
on the other categories is significant. In particular, the Budget 2020 proposals result in 55 
transitional regions, compared to 21 under a ‘rolling forward’ approach. Related, the 
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number of RCE regions falls from 184 under the Budget 2020 proposals, compared to 150 
under a ‘rolling forward’ approach. 
Map 4.3: Structural Fund areas 2014+ under a ‘rolling forward’ approach 
Structural Funds 2014+?
GDP(PPS) per head 2007-9 (est)
Convergence   (62)
Phasing-out   (5)
Phasing-in   (16)
RCE   (184)
 
Source: Own calculations using Eurostat data.  
(i) Convergence regions 
Looking first at the coverage of Convergence regions, several key points emerge from the 
calculations based on the most recent data (see Table 4.9).  
At a global level, coverage would fall from 31.7 percent to 24.1 percent of the EU27 
population, with coverage concentrated in 16 rather than 18 Member States, as previously. 
Eight Member States would lose population coverage; and eight would remain unchanged 
(save for changes in regional population). Specifically:  
x Germany would cease to have any Convergence regions; 
x coverage in Greece would fall from 36.6 percent to 15.1 percent of the population, 
with five regions losing Convergence status; 
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x Spain would have only one Convergence region (Extremadura); 
x in France¸  Martinique would lose Convergence status, although the other 
départ ements d’ out re mer would retain it; 
x Poland and Romania would no longer have Convergence status in their entirety: the 
capital regions of Mazowieckie and BucureĂti-Ilfov would become transitional 
regions; 
x Malt a would lose Convergence status and become a transitional region; and 
x Slovenia would partly be covered by Convergence status with coverage falling from 
100 percent to 54 percent following its split into two NUTS 2 regions, with the 
remainder becoming a transitional region. 
Table 4.9: Convergence region coverage 2014+? 
 Population % of population Share of total 
EU27 119,780 24.1 100.0 
EU25 92,830 19.9 77.5 
EU15 30,711 7.8 25.6 
Bulgaria 7,603 100.0 6.3 
Czech Republic 9,123 88.2 7.6 
Estonia 1,339 100.0 1.1 
Greece 1,695 15.1 1.4 
Spain 1,079 2.4 0.9 
France 1,459 2.3 1.2 
Italy 16,909 28.5 14.1 
Latvia 2,280 100.0 1.9 
Lithuania 3,386 100.0 2.8 
Hungary 7,175 71.5 6.0 
Poland 32,939 86.4 27.5 
Portugal 7,149 67.5 6.0 
Romania 19,347 90.1 16.2 
Slovenia 1,086 53.8 0.9 
Slovakia 4,792 88.9 4.0 
United Kingdom 2,419 4.0 2.0 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
(i i) Transit ion regions 
As noted earlier, the Budget 2020 proposals envisage two categories of Transition region: 
x ex-Convergence regions: 2007-13 Convergence areas where GDP(PPS) per head will 
exceed 75 percent of the EU27 average in the next period; 
x what might be termed ‘sliding scale’ regions:53 NUTS 2 regions where GDP(PPS) per 
head is between 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU27 average. 
                                                 
53 No specific terminology for the new categories is indicated in the proposals. 
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The regions concerned are illustrated in Map 4.2.  
The coverage of the ‘ex-Convergence’ Transition regions is shown in Table 4.10. This shows 
that around 35 million of the EU27 population falls into this category, and that over 80 
percent of the total is in Germany, Spain and Poland. 
Table 4.10: ‘Ex-Convergence’ Transition region coverage 2014+? 
 Population % of population Share of total 
EU27 34,874 7.0 100.0 
EU25 32,642 7.0 93.6 
EU15 26,127 6.6 74.9 
Germany 10,714 13.0 30.7 
Greece 2,364 21.1 6.8 
Spain 12,650 28.2 36.3 
France 399 0.6 1.1 
Malta 408 100.0 1.2 
Poland 5,172 13.6 14.8 
Romania 2,232 10.4 6.4 
Slovenia 934 46.3 2.7 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
‘Sliding scale’ Transition regions would, according to the calculations for this report, cover 
around 44 million inhabitants or almost nine percent of the EU27 population (see Table 
4.11). This population lies entirely within the EU15 Member States and covers substantial 
parts of Belgium, Greece, France and the United Kingdom. Together, France and the United 
Kingdom would account for almost two-thirds of the population in this category. 
Table 4.11: ‘Sliding scale’ Transition region coverage 2014+? 
 Transitional % of population Share of total 
EU27 44,123 8.9 100.0 
EU25 44,123 9.4 100.0 
EU15 44,123 11.2 100.0 
Belgium 3,074 29.0 7.0 
Germany 4,171 5.1 9.5 
Greece 2,222 19.8 5.0 
Spain 1,393 3.1 3.2 
France 17,573 27.5 39.8 
Italy 3,891 6.6 8.8 
Austria 281 3.4 0.6 
Portugal 424 4.0 1.0 
Finland 660 12.5 1.5 
United Kingdom 10,434 17.1 23.6 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
(i i i) Regional compet it iveness and employment  (RCE) 
Regional competitiveness and employment (RCE) is essentially a residual category for 
regions not qualifying under the Convergence or transitional headings. Reflecting the 
impact of the new transitional category for 75-90 percent areas, the RCE population would 
remain more or less the same (it would otherwise have increased substantially – see Map 
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4.3). It would also be heavily concentrated in the EU15: eight countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovenia) have no RCE regions; by contrast, 
six countries (Denmark, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden) are 
entirely covered by RCE status (see Table 4.12).  
Table 4.12: RCE region coverage 2014+? 
 RCE % of population Share of total 
EU27 297,704 60.0 100.0 
EU25 297,704 63.7 100.0 
EU15 292,231 74.3 98.2 
Belgium 7,544 71.0 2.5 
Czech Republic 1,198 11.6 0.4 
Denmark 5,464 100.0 1.8 
Germany  67,394 81.9 22.6 
Ireland 4,366 100.0 1.5 
Greece 4,904 43.8 1.6 
Spain 29,744 66.4 10.0 
France 44,350 69.5 14.9 
Italy 38,588 65.0 13.0 
Cyprus 785 100.0 0.3 
Luxembourg 480 100.0 0.2 
Hungary 2,881 28.7 1.0 
Netherlands 16,378 100.0 5.5 
Austria 8,026 96.8 2.7 
Portugal 3,050 28.8 1.0 
Slovakia 608 11.3 0.2 
Finland 4,633 87.5 1.6 
Sweden 9,182 100.0 3.1 
United Kingdom 48,130 79.0 16.2 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
4.3 Financial allocations 
Under the 2007-13 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), projected commitment 
appropriations amounted to 1.048 percent of GNI. This is equivalent to €987.5 billion (2011 
prices); of this €352 billion (2011 prices) was allocated to Heading 1b for Cohesion Policy.54  
For 2014-20,55  the Commission has proposed commitment allocations amounting to 1.05 
percent of GNI within the MFF.56 This being €1,025 billion (2011 prices), of which €336 
billion is allocated to Cohesion policy.  
In real terms, this therefore represents a modest decrease – just under five percent – in the 
funds allocated to Cohesion policy. A more detailed comparison is provided in Table 4.13. 
                                                 
54 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
budgetary discipline and sound financial management, OJEU No C139/1 of 14 June 2006; converted on 
the basis of DG ECFIN AMECO online GDP deflators.  
55 European Commission (2011) A budget  for Europe 2020, COM(2011)500 final of 29 June 2011. 
56 A further sum amounting to €58.3 billion, or 0.06 percent of GNI was proposed outside the MFF. 
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This shows that funding for two strands of policy (Convergence regions and the Cohesion 
Fund) the commitment appropriations would decrease - by almost a fifth in the case of the 
Convergence regions. In contrast, appropriations for the Transition regions would increase 
by almost half, those for territorial cooperation by over a third and those for RCE by a fifth.  
Importantly, however, the shifts in allocations partially reflect shifts in coverage. As a 
result, the per capit a amounts differ less significantly. For example, although the 
Convergence total would go down by almost 20 percent, the aid intensity would actually 
rise slightly because the Convergence population will be lower than before.  
Overall aid intensity for the Transition regions is significantly lower under the Budget 2020 
proposals than under MFF 2007-13, reflecting the extension of transitional provisions to 
regions which have never had Convergence status. Moreover, aid intensities can be 
expected to vary widely between former Convergence regions, which will receive two-
thirds of their previous allocation, and other Transition regions, which will receive more 
than RCE regions, but on a sliding scale depending on prosperity.  
Interestingly, aid intensity for the RCE regions is proposed to be significantly higher in 2014-
20 as against 2007-13, rising from €21.4 to €25.5 per head per annum. 
Table 4.13: Cohesion policy 2007-13 and Budget 2020 proposals compared (2011 prices) 
 2007-13 2014-20  
 € m 
% of 
total 
€ per 
head pa € m 
% of 
total 
€ per 
head pa 
% 
Change 
in total 
Convergence 
regions 202320 57.5 187.9 162590 48.4 193.9 -19.6 
Cohesion Fund 70331 20.0 60.6 68710 20.4 78.9 -2.3 
Transition regions, 
of which: 26170 7.4 105.6 38952 11.6 70.4 48.8 
x Phasing-out 14305 4.1 124.6     
x Phasing-in 11865 3.4 89.2     
RCE 44263 12.6 21.4 53143 15.8 25.5 20.1 
Territorial 
cooperation  8626 2.5 2.5 11700 3.5 3.4 35.6 
OMR and LPD    926    
TOTAL 351710 100.0  336021 100.0  -4.5 
Notes: (i) The 2007-13 figure for the Cohesion Fund includes the transitional arrangements for Spain; 
excluding Spain, per capita annual aid intensity would be around €76. (ii) Allocations for Outermost 
regions and low population density regions were not disaggregated in 2007-13, but the additional 
amount per head per annum was €35. 
Source: Own calculations from Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 laying down general provisions 
on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, OJEU 
No L210/25 of 31 July 2007, European Commission (2011) A budget  for Europe 2020, COM(2011)500 
final of 29 June 2011, Eurostat data and AMECO online. 
(i) Long-t erm t rends 
The long-term spending profiles implied by the Budget 2020 proposals are illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. This shows planned Cohesion policy expenditure steadily rising over the period 
2007-13, largely reflecting the spending profiles for the Convergence regions and the 
Cohesion Fund, the allocations for which were mainly driven by the impact of capping in 
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the EU12. In this period, RCE and ETC spending essentially remain static, while spending 
under the transitional arrangements – Phasing-in and Phasing-out – declines over the period. 
In fact, by 2013, transitional spend will be at just one-third of 2007 values, reflecting the 
tapering of support.  
Between 2013 and 2014, total commitment appropriations would decline quite steeply 
before rising steadily over the period. The initial decline is the consequence of the 
allocations to the Convergence regions and the Cohesion Fund for 2014, which are 
significantly lower than in 2013, but then rise slightly over the period, albeit not as steeply 
as in 2007-13. In contrast, allocations to Transition, RCE and ETC actually increase between 
2013 and 2014. Perhaps most surprising is that there is no apparent tapering of Transition 
region spend from 2014-20 – this, like RCE and ETC spend - remains essentially static over 
the period, rather belying its supposedly transitional nature. 
Figure 4.1: Trends in Cohesion policy commitment appropriations (€m, 2011 prices) 
0
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Total Convergence Cohesion Fund Transitional RCE ETC
Source: Own calculations from Commission commitment appropriation decisions (OJEU L243 of 6 
September 2006) and AMECO online; European Commission (2011) A budget  for Europe 2020, 
COM(2011)500 final of 29 June 2011. 
(i i) Financial  al locat ion mechanisms 
The Budget 2020 proposals contain some important changes to the mechanisms for 
allocating funding under the different strands. At the same time, it appears that some key 
elements will remain unchanged, but there are also a number of uncertainties. 
Among the apparent changes to funding allocations are: 
x Capping of Cohesion policy allocations at 2.5 percent of GNI. This contrasts with the 
approach for 2007-13 in two main respects. First, for 2007-13, the cap is set as a 
percentage of GDP, not GNI. Second, the level of the cap varies according to 
prosperity as measured by GNI(PPS) per head from almost 3.8 percent of GDP in the 
case of Latvia, to less than one percent for Luxembourg. Of course, although the 
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capping system was in principle generalised to all Member States, in practice it 
applied only to nine of the EU12 – it did not bite in the case of Malta, Cyprus and 
Slovenia, nor did it apply to any of the EU15. 
x The abandonment of the one-third/two-thirds split between the Cohesion Fund and 
the Structural Funds for the then ‘new’ Member States; this is not mentioned in the 
Budget 2020 proposals which give a total budget for the Cohesion Fund, rather than 
an initial per capita allocation as for 2007-13. 
x The introduction of a fixed proportion (two-thirds) of the previous Convergence 
allocation for all regions losing convergence status. 
Among the uncertainties are: 
x the role (if any) of growth forecasts in determining the level of capping;  
x the methodology for allocations to the ‘sliding scale’ transitional regions; 
x the baseline for determining allocations to ex-Convergence regions, eg. post-
transfers to rural development and fisheries, post-capping, post-Cohesion Fund 
adjustment;  
x the formulae for allocating RCE and ETC monies. 
Despite the number of ‘unknowns’, the approach to allocating funding has a number of 
precedents embedded within it. This is particularly so for allocations to the Convergence 
regions, where the so-called ‘Berlin formula’ has been applied on two occasions; the 
Budget 2020 proposals do not explicitly indicate any changes to the Berlin formula. It could 
be argued that the use of a ‘distribution key’ for allocating Cohesion Fund monies has also 
become entrenched.  
Of central importance, however, and notwithstanding the Berlin formula and the Cohesion 
Fund key, it is clear that for least prosperous Member States the GNI cap, however defined, 
will continue to determine funding allocations. This is illustrated in the discussion in the 
following sections, which focuses primarily on the Convergence regions and the Cohesion 
Fund. 
(i i i) Convergence region al locat ions 
The basic mechanism for allocating funding to the Convergence regions for 2007-13 was 
modelled on the Berlin formula used for 2000-6. This involved making an allocation based 
on regional disparities in GDP per head, adjusted for national prosperity, and high 
unemployment – the basic principle being that the Convergence region allocation should be 
related to the prosperity ‘gap’. The steps involved in the Berlin formula are illustrated in 
Box 5. 
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Box 5: Calculation of the annual allocation for Convergence regions 
 
In looking forward, the main change applied to the methodology in the calculations 
presented here has been to adjust the national prosperity criterion to reflect enlargement 
from EU25 to EU27.57 The outcome of applying this formula (excluding the unemployment 
premium) is shown in Table 4.14, alongside the Convergence region allocation for 2007-13, 
but expressed on a common price footing (2011) for the purposes of comparison.  
The most striking aspect of Table 4.14 is the budgetary impact of applying the Berlin 
formula wit hout  capping. Even though the calculations presented earlier suggested that the 
Convergence population would fal l  by almost 34 million (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.9), 
Table 4.14 suggests that a straight reapplication of the Berlin formula – i.e.  wit hout  
capping - would require the Convergence region budget to rise from €201 billion to €391 
billion (2011 prices); this contrasts with the proposed sum of €162.59 billion indicated in 
the Budget 2020 proposals. 
                                                 
57  It should be stressed that these calculations rest on the assumption that the so-called Berlin 
method would be reapplied essentially unchanged save for updating, but this is by no means certain. 
1. Calculate difference between regional GDP per head and the EU average. 
2. Multiply result by national prosperity coefficient: 
GNI(PPS) per head – EU25=100 National prosperity coefficient 
< 82 
>82 <99 
>99 
4.25% 
3.36% 
2.67% 
3. Gives allocation per head of regional population; multiply by regional population to 
give total regional allocation. 
4. Add €700 per person unemployed in excess of the Convergence region average, if 
applicable. (This is not applied in the discussions that follow; the data are not readily 
available and the addition makes little difference to the outcome, especially given the 
impact of capping). 
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Table 4.14: Uncapped Convergence region allocations 2014+? (€m, 2011 prices) 
 2007-13 2014-20 
EU27 201,814 391,192 
EU15 87,799 56,441 
EU25 184,700 266,362 
Bulgaria 4,414 33,286 
Czech Republic 17,265 21,844 
Germany 12,027 - 
Estonia 2,271 3,357 
Greece 9,550 3,014 
Spain 21,342 1,400 
France 3,234 2,571 
Italy 21,502 27,277 
Latvia 3,017 7,858 
Lithuania 4,519 10,726 
Hungary 14,421 29,060 
Malta 564 - 
Poland 45,000 120,487 
Portugal 17,368 18,960 
Romania 12,700 91,544 
Slovenia 2,744 1,713 
Slovakia 7,100 14,877 
United Kingdom 2,776 3,219 
Source: Own calculations from Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 (2006/594/EC - as amended), 
Eurostat data and AMECO online. 
(iv) Cohesion Fund al locat ions 
For 2007-13 there were two elements to the allocation of the Cohesion Fund, the first of 
which applied to all eligible Member States and the second only to the EU12 Member States. 
The first phase involved the distribution of a ‘theoretical financial envelope’ obtained by 
multiplying average aid intensity of €44.7 per head per annum (2004 prices) by the eligible 
population.58 This sum was allocated on the basis of a ‘distribution key’ which took account 
of eligible Member State shares of population and surface area, adjusted by national GNI to 
favour the poorer Member States. For Greece and Portugal, the Cohesion Fund allocation 
was the outcome of this method. For the EU12 Member States, there was a second stage 
which involved adjusting the Cohesion Fund allocation so that it represented one-third of 
the Cohesion policy allocation over the 2007-13 period.  
The Budget 2020 proposals specify a fixed budget - €68.710 billion - for the Cohesion Fund 
(rather than an indicative per capita amount) and make no mention of the one-third/two-
thirds rule. The calculations presented below take the proposed budget and divide it among 
the eligible Member States according to the distribution key described above; the one-third 
adjustment for the EU12 is not applied. 
As mentioned earlier, it is almost certain that some form of transitional arrangement would 
be made for Cyprus – assuming that the criteria remained unchanged; however, as for 
                                                 
58 The Commission had proposed that the same aid intensity should apply in 2007-13 as in 2004-06.  
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Ireland and Spain in the past, this would be the subject of negotiation. On the basis of 
2008-10 GNI data, Greece and Portugal are the only EU15 countries that would qualify.  
Table 4.15: Cohesion Fund allocations 2007-13 and 2014+? (€m, 2011 prices) 
 2007-13 2014-20 
EU27 70,155 68,710 
EU25 61,284 46,664 
EU15 10,554 12,045 
Bulgaria 2,296 6,898 
Czech Republic 8,923 5,625 
Estonia 1,162 1,282 
Greece 3,748 8,133 
Spain 3,704 0 
Cyprus 221 0 
Latvia 1,554 2,038 
Lithuania 2,318 2,289 
Hungary 8,649 4,348 
Malta 288 165 
Poland 22,294 16,041 
Portugal 3,102 3,912 
Romania 6,575 15,147 
Slovenia 1,412 720 
Slovakia 3,912 2,111 
Source: Own calculations from Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 (2006/594/EC - as amended), 
Eurostat data and AMECO online, together with indications from Budget 2020. 
(v) Transit ion regions – ‘ ex-Convergence’  
As mentioned above, special provisions are proposed for regions losing Convergence status. 
These are to retain two-thirds of their current receipts. This is not straightforward to 
calculate given the uncertainties outlined above. Nevertheless, some estimates can be 
made and these are set out in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.16: Transition regions (‘ex-Convergence’) allocations 2014+? 
 € million (2011 prices) 
EU27 26507 
EU25 25982 
EU15 24154 
Germany 8018 
Greece 3207 
Spain 12646 
France 282 
Malta 376 
Poland 1173 
Romania 525 
Slovenia 279 
Source: Own calculations from Commission Decision of 4 August 2006 2006/594/EC (as amended), 
Eurostat data and AMECO online, together with indications from Budget 2020. 
These figures suggest that the transitional arrangements for former Convergence regions 
could involve around €26.5 billion. Of this, the bulk would be accounted for by Germany, 
where no Convergence regions would remain on the basis of the calculations in this paper, 
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and Spain. Also of note, these figures suggest that around €12.5 billion would remain for 
the ‘sliding scale’ Transition regions. 
(vi) Out comes and t he impact  of  capping 
As noted, for nine Member States, a crucial feature of the 2007-13 methodology was the 
imposition of an annual limit on transfers expressed as a percentage of projected GDP for 
that year. Initially, the cap had been set at four percent and restricted to the EU10 Member 
States. However, in the course of the negotiations, the cap was generalised and made 
progressive so that the poorer the Member State, the higher could be the Cohesion policy 
allocations as a proportion of GDP. At the same time, however, the limit was reduced to 
below four percent in all cases; moreover, as Table 4.17 shows, the system of limits was 
not meaningful ly generalised, as the cap only ‘bites’ in the case of the least prosperous 
countries. Of crucial importance, the cap was applied to forecast s of GDP over the planning 
period, so that predictions of annual GDP growth rates had a direct and material impact on 
the Cohesion policy allocations to those countries where the cap applied. 
Table 4.17: Absorption cap 2007-13 
 
GNI(PPS) per head 
(EU25=100) Cap - % of GDP Allocation affected? 
Latvia 39.5 3.7893 Yes 
Lithuania 42.4 3.7135 Yes 
Estonia 44.4 3.7135 Yes 
Poland 45.5 3.7135 Yes 
Slovakia 51.1 3.6188 Yes 
Hungary 55.7 3.5240 Yes 
Czech Republic 64.9 3.4293 Yes 
Malta 73.5 3.2398 No 
Portugal 75.2 3.1498 No 
Slovenia 75.7 3.1498 No 
Greece 77.9 3.1498 No 
Cyprus 82.5 3.0598 No 
Spain 94.1 2.8798 No 
Germany  108.7 2.6098 No 
Italy 108.7 2.6098 No 
Ireland 110.8 2.5198 No 
Finland 113.6 2.5198 No 
France 114.0 2.5198 No 
Sweden 115.6 2.4298 No 
United Kingdom 119.6 2.4298 No 
Belgium 120.2 2.3398 No 
Austria 121.1 2.3398 No 
Netherlands 121.5 2.3398 No 
Denmark 122.9 2.3398 No 
Luxembourg 195.3 0.9898 No 
Source: General Regulation Annex II, paragraph 7, and own calculations from AMECO online, Eurostat 
data and Multiannual Financial Framework 2007-2013, Fiche No. 1b. 
Looking forward, a somewhat different approach is implied by the Budget 2020 proposals. 
Under these, the cap would be set at a uniform rate of 2.5 percent of GNI (not GDP), but 
no information is provided about whether this cap would be applied to a single year’s GNI 
or to forecasts, as in 2007-13.  
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That said, the scale of the reductions required suggests that the cap may have been applied 
simply as a proportion of 2011 GNI. The potential impact of capping on this basis is 
illustrated in Table 4.18. These figures should be treated with some caution. All are based 
on assumptions and very limited information about how they might be calculated in 
practice. An important missing element is whether any a priori breakdown between the 
Cohesion Fund and the Structural Funds is envisaged – in the past a one-third/two-thirds 
breakdown applied to the EU12. This is an important detail since, for example, for Bulgaria 
the absorption cap as suggested in the table is actually lower than the theoretical 
allocation to the Cohesion Fund. This implies that some further mechanism to determine 
the allocation of monies between the Convergence region objective and the Cohesion Fund 
is envisaged. Notwithstanding these cautionary remarks, these data are probably adequate 
to provide some general orders of magnitude based on the information currently available. 
Values for the Transition ‘sliding scale’ and RCE regions, as well as ETC are excluded from 
the total, but, if the same approach were adopted as before, would be included in capping. 
Countries which are set only to receive ‘sliding scale’, RCE and ETC funds are excluded 
from the table. 
Table 4.18: The impact of capping 2014+? (€m, 2011 prices) 
 
Convergence 
Region 
Cohesion 
Fund 
Transition: 
Ex-Con Total 
Absorption 
cap 
EU27 391,192 68,710 26,507 486,409  
EU25 56,441 46,664 25,982 129,087  
EU15 266,362 12,045 24,154 302,561  
Bulgaria 33,286 6,898  40,184 6,513 
Czech Rep 21,844 5,625  27,469 25,214 
Germany   8,018 8,018 459,052 
Estonia 3,357 1,282  4,639 2,576 
Greece 3,014 8,133 3,207 14,354 37,850 
Spain 1,400  12,646 14,046 186,406 
France 2,571  282 2,853 355,658 
Italy 27,277   27,277 276,293 
Latvia 7,858 2,038  9,896 3,265 
Lithuania 10,726 2,289  13,015 5,084 
Hungary 29,060 4,348  33,408 17,646 
Malta  165 376 541 1,065 
Poland 120,487 16,041 1,173 137,701 64,511 
Portugal 18,960 3,912  22,872 28,729 
Romania 91,544 15,147 525 107,216 22,655 
Slovenia 1,713 720 279 2,712 6,371 
Slovakia 14,877 2,111  16,988 11,954 
United Kingdom 3,219   3,219 308,579 
Note: Total excludes ‘sliding scale’ transitional regions, RCE and ETC. 
Source: Table 4.14, Table 4.15, Table 4.16 and own calculations from Eurostat data and AMECO 
online. 
The key point to note about Table 4.18 is the very significant impact of capping on some 
countries. It would seem that the same nine countries would be affected by capping as in 
2007-13; however, the scale of the impact varies very widely. It would be limited in the 
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Czech Republic (where the cap is just over 90 percent of the estimated Cohesion policy 
total – excluding RCE and ETC) but very dramatic in several other countries, such as 
Bulgaria (where the cap is 16 percent of the Convergence and Cohesion Fund total), 
Romania (21 percent), Latvia (33 percent), Lithuania (39 percent) and Poland (46 percent). 
Moreover, in several cases, notably the Baltic states and Hungary, the ‘new’ cap would 
impose a substantial reduction in Cohesion policy receipts compared to 2007-13. 
4.4 Member State reactions 
Decisions on geographical eligibility and financial allocations are always the most politically 
contentious negotiation issues in Cohesion policy reviews due to the financial stakes 
involved and connections to broader budgetary politics in the EU. As noted earlier (see 
Section 3.2), five Member States (Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) signed a letter to the Commission calling for a real-terms freeze in the 
overall post-2013 budget, while the more recent non-paper (adding Austria, Italy and 
Sweden to the previous five signatories) has criticised the Commission’s Budget 2020 
proposals as being too high. Although Cohesion Policy was not mentioned, two of these 
countries (Netherlands, UK) have stated that Cohesion Policy funding should fall in their 
responses to the Fifth Cohesion Report, while Sweden had argued for a reprioritisation of 
funding away from the CAP and Cohesion Policy in its earlier budget review position. In the 
opposing camp, the letter from 12 ‘net beneficiaries’ has called for “an ambitious cohesion 
policy” with a share in the EU budget “of at least its present level”.   
A second area of political division concerns the question of national versus regional 
eligibility and financial concentration. The ‘group of 12’ maintain that all EU regions should 
remain eligible, but that the focus should remain on the less prosperous regions. By 
contrast, the UK government is calling for a phased withdrawal of funding in the wealthiest 
Member States, and other responses to the Fifth Cohesion Report argue that there should 
be more concentration on less-developed countries and regions (Denmark, Latvia, 
Netherlands). In this context, Portugal and the UK share the view that the national 
prosperity coefficient should be given more weight in the allocation formula, albeit for 
different reasons. Other countries would like to see greater focus on less-developed regions 
(Belgium, Germany, Greece, Latvia), involving a higher level or at least the retention of the 
current level of concentration on the Convergence objective (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia). 
The proposal for a new intermediate category of Transition regions is also contentious. 
While a significant number of countries have offered support or consider that the idea is 
worth examining (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Spain), Austria, Denmark and Sweden state that funding should be limited or reduced for 
this category, while Italy and the Netherlands have rejected the proposal. In the French 
government’s response to the Budget 2020 proposals, it states that the increase in funds for 
Competitiveness regions is “ unaccept able” . 
Another critical issue is the proposal for financial envelopes to be decided ex-ante for the 
ESF and ERDF/CF. Almost every Member State that expressed a view on this rejected the 
European Policies Research Paper No. 81  European Policies Research Centre 43
A Budget and Cohesion Policy for Europe 2020: Let the Negotiations Begin 
European Policies Research Paper No. 81  European Policies Research Centre 44
idea e.g. Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden). They insisted, instead, that the split between funds 
should remain a Member State decision, albeit decided in partnership with the Commission 
during programme negotiations. Nevertheless, in the subsequent Budget 2020 
Communication, the Commission proposed that minimum shares for the ESF should be 
established for each category of regions, with specified percentages (25 percent for 
Convergence regions, 40 percent for Transition regions and 52 percent for Regional 
Competiveness and Employment regions). 
Lastly, the creation of a Connecting Europe facility, absorbing some of the Cohesion Policy 
budget, has elicited negative reactions from some Member States. Regional stakeholders 
and the European Parliament fear that it may lead to greater centralisation and 
sectoralisation of Cohesion Policy.59   
4.5 Concluding points 
The analysis in this section provides an assessment of the implications of the Commission’s 
reform proposals for eligibility of financial allocations. It has been careful to include a 
number of caveats, partly because the calculations here have, in some cases, been based 
on estimates and partly because the Budget 2020 proposals do not contain sufficiently 
detailed information for making firm assessments.  
Notwithstanding these cautionary remarks, it is fair to say that a somewhat different policy 
landscape emerges from Budget 2020. This partly owes to regional economic growth and 
the use of EU27 averages which together have the effect of reducing significantly the 
coverage of the Convergence regions. In particular, regional growth would result in several 
German and Spanish regions losing Convergence status, along with the capital regions of 
Poland and Romania. The introduction of a new definition of transitional region will also 
alter the pattern of intervention. This will comprise: former Convergence regions that have 
‘outgrown’ that status – this is in line with past transitional arrangements; and regions with 
GDP in the range 75-90 percent of the EU27 average. This is a break with past practice 
creating a new category of assisted area covering over 11 percent of the EU15 population. 
Overall, the Budget 2020 proposals suggest a modest decrease in the Cohesion Policy 
budget. This is largely borne by a reduction in Convergence spending, although per capita 
spend on Convergence would rise slightly; RCE spending would rise significantly both in 
absolute and per capita terms; and Transition region spending would increase by half.  
Financial allocation mechanisms are difficult to replicate in the absence of methodological 
detail, although past practice does provide some guidance. In spite of the difficulties the 
key point to note is the overriding importance of capping in determining financial 
allocations, especially for the least prosperous Member States. Moreover, for these 
countries, the cap proposed is substantially lower than it was in 2007-13. As a result, for 
                                                 
59 Euractiv.com (2011) Regions fear being sidelined in new EU infrastructure fund, Euract iv.com, 28 
June 2011, Brussels. 
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main beneficiaries of the Convergence and Cohesion Funds the outcomes of the allocation 
formulae are hypothetical and the appropriations are set to be determined purely as a 
proportion of GNI. 
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5. COHESION POLICY 2014+: A NEW REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
The package of draft regulations is scheduled to be tabled by the Commission on 6 October 
2011. Detailed work on the draft Regulations will then begin in the Council’s Structural 
Actions Working Party on the basis of an intensive schedule of meetings organised by the 
Polish Presidency.  
Much is already known about the key directions and content of the proposals. The building 
blocks were set out by the Commission in the Fifth Cohesion Report (November 2010) and 
further clarified in the Budget 2020 proposals (July 2011). Commission thinking and Member 
State reactions have also been sounded out in advance through the creation of informal 
working groups, the ‘High Level Group to Reflect on the Future of Cohesion Policy’ and the 
‘Task Force on Conditionalities’. Further indications of country positions are available from 
the national responses to the Fifth Cohesion Report consultation (ending in January 2011) 
and the informal meetings organised under the Hungarian Presidency, including the Council 
conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion report issued in June 2011.  
The following sections reviews this material in detail, drawing on a meta-analysis of 
national positions and broader academic and policy literature relating to the reform of 
Cohesion policy undertaken by the authors for the European Parliament’s REGI 
Committee.60 
5.1 Objectives: Europe 2020 and the territorial dimension 
The Fifth Cohesion Report restates the Treaty objectives and close association with Europe 
2020 goals: ‘Cohesion Policy aims to promote harmonious development of the Union and its 
regions by reducing regional disparities (Article 174 of the Treaty). It also underpins the 
growth model of the Europe 2020 strategy including the need to respond to societal and 
employment challenges all Member States and regions face.’ Similarly, the Budget 2020 
Communication underlines that the ‘primary objective of EU cohesion policy is to reduce 
the significant economic, social and territorial disparities that still exist between Europe's 
regions’ and that ‘Cohesion policy also has a key role to play in delivering the Europe 2020 
objectives throughout the EU’. 61  A strong case is made for increasing the alignment 
between Cohesion Policy and Europe 2020 in these documents, including a series of 
governance-related proposals. The Cohesion Report also acknowledges, albeit with less 
conviction, the addition of ‘territorial’ cohesion to the goals of economic and social 
cohesion and sets out several implications for the governance of Cohesion Policy.  
                                                 
60 Mendez C, Bachtler J and Wishlade F (Forthcoming) Comparat ive St udy on t he Visions and Opt ions 
for Cohesion Pol icy af t er 2013, Policy Department B: Structural and Cohesion Policies, DG for Internal 
Policies, European Parliament, Brussels. 
61 European Commission (2011) A budget  for Europe 2020 - Part II: Policy fiches, COM(2011)500 final, 
Brussels. 
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From a Member State perspective, the need for alignment of Cohesion objectives with 
Europe 2020 objectives has widespread support. There are, however, concerns that this 
may undermine traditional cohesion goals. Several of the national responses to the 
consultation on the Fifth Cohesion Report stressed that the primary and overarching 
objective must remain economic, social and territorial cohesion irrespective of the 
alignment with Europe 2020 (e.g. Cyprus, Czech Republic, France and Hungary). By 
contrast, the German contribution presented the relationship in positive sum terms. 62  
Similarly, the Council Conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion Report underline that ‘the 
objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy can only be achieved in a sustainable manner if 
disparities between the levels of development in the European Union continue to be 
reduced.’63  
The main Commission proposals in relation to the new territorial dimension of cohesion 
objectives are to support or reinforce the urban agenda, functional geographies, areas 
facing specific geographical or demographic problems and macro-regional strategies. 
x The role of cities: an ‘ambitious’ urban agenda is required, involving a clearer 
identification of urban actions, resources and targeted cities. Urban authorities should 
also play a stronger role in the design and implementation of urban strategies. 
x Programme management adapted to functional areas: Greater flexibility to organise 
OPs in accordance with the geography of development processes by, for instance, 
designing and managing programmes at the level of groups of towns or of river and sea 
basins. 
x Areas facing specific geographical or demographic problems: Targeted provisions are 
required to address the problems of outermost regions, northernmost regions, island and 
cross-border and mountain regions, in line with Treaty objective on Territorial cohesion. 
Urban-rural linkages and social exclusion should also be addressed. 
x Macro-regional strategies: should be reviewed and supported by a reinforced 
transnational strand, although funded mainly through national and regional programmes 
and other sources. 
A broader perspective on the new territorial cohesion objective is provided in the analytical 
section of the Report. It does not identify concrete proposals as such, but it does suggest 
that more attention should be given to access to services, sustainable development, 
functional geographies and territorial analysis (Box 6). 
 
                                                 
62  Stating that ‘Cohesion Policy has made a substantial contribution to spreading growth and 
prosperity throughout the European Union and to reducing economic and social disparities and should 
continue to play an important role so that smart, sustainable and inclusive growth can be attained in 
line with the priorities of the Europe 2020 Strategy, whilst the reduction in regional disparities fosters 
a harmonious development in the European Union and its regions.’ 
63 Council of the European Union (2011) Council Conclusions on the Fifth Report on economic, social 
and territorial cohesion, 3068th General Affairs Council meeting, 21 February 2011, Brussels.  
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Box 6: Territorial Cohesion themes in the Fifth Cohesion Report 
 
Access to services of general economic interest: including education, health care and commercial, 
financial and business services. In remote and sparsely populated regions, physical accessibility is a 
prominent concern. This is increasingly being overcome by e-services such as e-health, e-education, 
e-government and e-banking. In other regions, access may be hindered by cost or a lack of knowledge 
of the system or, among migrants, of the local language. In some cases, discrimination may also limit 
this access. 
 
The environment and sustainable development: Environmental protection, climate change and 
renewable energy production have a strong territorial dimension. The territorial dimension of 
environmental protection, which ranges from air quality and waste water treatment to protected 
habitats and species under Natura 2000 and the provision of ecosystem services, is increasingly 
recognised. The growing threat of climate change and the political goal to radically increase the share 
of renewable energy in the EU underlines the fact that policies at different levels will need to be 
coordinated to respond to these various threats and opportunities in an efficient and effective way 
and to avoid them counteracting each other. 
 
Functional geographies: the pursuit of territorial cohesion implies a more functional and flexible 
approach. Depending on the issue, the appropriate geographical dimension ranges from a macro 
region, such as the Baltic Sea or the Danube region, to metropolitan and cross-border regions or a 
group of rural areas and market towns. Such a flexible geography can better capture the positive and 
negative externalities of concentration, improve connections and facilitate cooperation and so be 
more effective in furthering territorial cohesion. 
 
Territorial analysis: There is need for better knowledge of the EU in territorial terms and more 
robust ways of estimating the territorial impact of EU policies. Eurostat, the Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) and the European Environmental Agency (EEA) have significantly increased the data available 
for more finely defined geographical areas. The Urban Audit and the Urban Atlas provide more 
indicators for cities, Eurostat and the National Statistical Institutes have increased data at NUTS 3 
level, and the JRC and EEA are providing more grid data and developing more detailed models. ESPON 
is making use of these new data and undertaking territorial trend analyses, impact assessments and 
prospective studies. 
 
Source: European Commission (2010) Investing in Europe’s future, Fifth Report on Economic, Social 
and Territorial Cohesion, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 
A notable development in the territorial cohesion debate is the adoption of the EU 
Territorial Agenda for 2020, agreed at the EU Informal Ministerial Meeting of Ministers 
responsible for Spatial Planning and Territorial Development on 10 May 2011 under the 
Hungarian Presidency in Gödöllġ (Box 7). It underlines that all EU policies should take 
territorial cohesion into consideration, while identifying Cohesion Policy as a key framework 
for delivering the agenda. However, like the previous Territorial Agenda agreed in 2007, it 
is not a legally binding framework as such, but rather ‘an action oriented policy framework’ 
providing ‘strategic orientations’ to support the new Treaty goal of territorial cohesion.  
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Box 7: The Territorial Agenda for 2020 
 
The objective of the TA2020 is ‘to provide strategic orientations for territorial development, fostering 
integration of territorial dimension within different policies at all governance levels and to ensure 
implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy according to territorial cohesion principles.’ The key 
territorial priorities identified to meet the EU’s territorial challenges are:  
 
1. Promoting polycentric and balanced territorial development: is a key element of territorial 
cohesion to foster territorial competitiveness of the EU. Cities should form innovative networks to 
improve their global competitiveness and promote sustainable development. Polycentric development 
is necessary at the macro-regional, cross-border and national and regional levels. Polarization 
between capitals, metropolitan areas and medium sized towns should be avoided and policy should 
contribute to reducing territorial polarisation and regional disparities by addressing bottlenecks to 
growth in line with Europe 2020 Strategy. 
 
2. Encouraging integrated development in cities, rural and specific areas: cities are seen as motors 
of smart, sustainable and inclusive development and attractive places to live, work, visit and invest 
in. Integrated and multilevel approaches in urban development are needed. Cities should focus on 
functional regions where appropriate. Rural areas should take develop their unique characteristics. 
Urban-rural interdependence should be recognised through integrated governance and planning based 
on partnership. Coastal zones, islands, including island states, mountainous areas, plains, river valleys 
and lake basins and other types of territories have special features, or suffer from severe handicaps, 
while outermost regions have specific constraints. These potentials can be unleashed and problems 
tackled in an integrated way.  
 
3. Territorial integration in cross-border and transnational functional regions: is an important 
factor in fostering global competitiveness, utilising valuable natural, landscape and cultural heritage, 
city networks and labour markets divided by borders. Attention should also be paid to external EU 
borders. Cross-border and transnational functional regions may require proper policy coordination 
between different countries. The focus should be on developments and results of real cross-border or 
transnational relevance. European Territorial Cooperation should be better embedded within 
national, regional and local development strategies. 
 
4. Ensuring global competiveness of the regions based on strong local economies: the use of social 
capital, territorial assets, and the development of innovation and smart specialisation strategies in a 
place-based approach can play a key role. The global and local strands are mutually reinforcing. 
Integration of local endowments, characteristics and traditions into the global economy is important 
in strengthening local responses and reducing vulnerability to external forces. It is important to 
preserve and improve the innovation capacity of all regions. Diversification can decrease local 
vulnerability. 
 
5. Improving territorial connectivity for individuals, communities and enterprises: fair and 
affordable accessibility to services of general interest are essential for territorial cohesion. Emphasis 
is placed on access to road, rail, waterway and air transport, broadband and trans-European energy 
and transport networks. Inter-modal transport solutions are important within city-regions; as are 
secondary networks at regional and local level.  
 
6. Managing and connecting ecological, landscape and cultural values of regions: well-functioning 
ecological systems and the protection and enhancement of cultural and natural heritage are 
important conditions for sustainable development. Joint risk management is particularly important, 
taking geographical specificities into account. The integration of ecological systems and areas 
protected for their natural values into green infrastructure networks at all levels is supported. The 
protection, rehabilitation and utilization of heritage through a place-based approach is of key 
importance. 
Source: Territorial Agenda for 2020 
More recently, the Commission has made a number of proposals to promote the use of the 
EGTC instrument in the next period.64     
                                                 
64 European Commission (2011) The appl icat ion of  t he Regulat ion (EC) No 1082/ 2006 on a European 
Grouping of  Territ orial  Cooperat ion (EGTC), Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, COM(2011) 462 final, Brussels. 
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x First, several targeted regulatory modifications should be introduced to allow EGTCs to 
be created between public bodies from only one Member State and from non-Member 
States, and to expedite EGTC set up in the absence of reasoned objections by national 
authorities; to extend the purpose of an EGTC to cover strategy and the planning and 
management of regional and local concerns in line with EU policies; and to introduce an 
insurance-based solution for setting-up of EGTCs with limited liability. 
x Second, the Commission will seek to clarify that that the convention establishing an 
EGTC must state clearly under which laws it will operate, that private bodies submitted 
to public procurement rules may be members of EGTCs and that the EGTC’s statutes 
must clearly set out the rules under which it will operate. 
x Third, the use of EGTCs in other policies will be encouraged - including macro-regional 
strategies and inter-regional cooperation projects outside ETC, environmental policy, 
research collaboration, education and culture etc - and problems linked to cross-border 
public procurement will be resolved. 
x Lastly, to diffuse information on the implementation of the EGTC Regulation in the 
Member States more widely, to collaborate pro-actively with the Committee of the 
Regions on the EGTC Platform, and to encourage sharing of know-how, networking and 
regular exchange of views. 
Returning to the Fifth Cohesion Report conclusions, national policy-maker reactions to some 
of the proposals were provided in the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy.65 
Beginning with the local/urban development agenda, the idea of introducing a more precise 
regulatory framework, potentially including minimum earmarked shares of funding, 
received a lukewarm response. Some policy-makers consider that stricter regulatory 
requirements are necessary to guarantee a more systematic approach, while others would 
prefer flexibility in identifying target cities and financial allocations in line with the present 
arrangements. Related, proposals for EU-level ‘zoning’ - designation of minimum and 
maximum areas’ population size for targeting interventions - were universally rejected. 
While there are lessons that could be learned from the more prescriptive rural development 
(LEADER) approach, on which the Commission’s ideas appear to be grounded, national 
experts noted significant implementation difficulties with this model in practice and did not 
support its transfer en masse to the ERDF. A more promising idea could be the adoption of 
single strategic framework for local development, although it was noted that the 
harmonisation of delivery rules for all Funds (ERDF, CF, ESF, EARDF and EFF) was more 
urgent, especially to facilitate an integrated approach.  
At the political level, similar views were expressed in the official responses to the Fifth 
Cohesion Report. While a number of countries argued that the urban agenda merits special 
attention (Austria, Belgium, Latvia), particularly the role of cities and city regions as 
engines of growth, creativity and innovation (Netherlands, Sweden), others underlined that 
                                                 
65 DG Regio (2010) Report of Sixth Meeting, High Level Group Reflecting on Future Cohesion Policy, 
23-24 September 2010, Brussels; DG Regio (2010) Report of Seventh Meeting, High Level Group 
Reflecting On Future Cohesion Policy, 2-3 December 2010, Brussels.  
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this is already possible under existing provisions (Denmark, Ireland, Sweden) and that the 
priority given to the theme will very much depend on the domestic context (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia). In this respect, several countries rejected the idea of setting earmarking 
thresholds or requiring global grants to be set up (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy). Other issues that may merit closer attention in the future are how to 
reinforce the integrated approach in urban policies (France, Hungary, Slovakia) or improve 
linkages to rural areas (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden). 
A second territorial theme discussed in the High-Level Group on the future of Cohesion 
Policy was the European Territorial Cooperation Objective. Three main issues dominated 
the discussions.  
x The need for more strategic focus was recognised, but some expressed scepticism 
about the addition of new goals or subordination to Europe 2020 objectives.  
x More strategic alignment is required with mainstream programmes, external cross-
border cooperation and macro-regional strategies. The main concern with respect 
to macro-regional strategies is that they should not replace the transnational strand 
as this would exclude some Member States and regions or encourage the creation of 
artificial macro-regions.  
x Simplification of administrative requirements is required, arguably more so than in 
the mainstream programmes because of the additional challenges arising from the 
multi-regional/national nature of territorial cooperation. On the other hand, there 
were also calls for more detailed regulatory provisions on territorial cooperation in 
the regulation, including EU-wide eligibility conditions and a more active 
Commission role through guidance and neutral arbitration. 
The urgency of reviewing and simplifying the implementation rules and structures was 
particularly evident in the national positions on the Fifth Cohesion Report (Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland). Many countries called for harmonised eligibility rules (Cyprus, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Sweden), and some would welcome the 
establishment of a specific regulation on territorial cooperation (Austria, Spain). Most of 
the responses did not offer concrete suggestions for improving the strategic impact or 
effectiveness of territorial cooperation, beyond better coordination with other programmes 
(Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden) or thematic concentration (Netherlands, Poland). 
The macro-regional approach is considered to be an important expression of territorial 
cohesion (Austria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom). 
However, many countries consider that more evidence is needed of the benefits (Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, UK); that their relevance is 
limited to specific areas (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, United Kingdom); and that there 
should be no new instruments, funding or implementation structures (Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Italy, Latvia). And while there may be lessons for improving 
transnational cooperation, some responses underlined that macro-regions should not lessen 
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the significance of the existing transnational strand of the European Territorial Cooperation 
Objective (Italy, Luxembourg, United Kingdom).  
The idea of more flexible management arrangement to support the targeting of functional 
areas received limited support; the creation of new management structures is regarded as 
being expensive or not feasible without appropriate responsibilities being in place (Austria, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland). 
More generally, there is agreement among the Member States that the overarching 
objective of territorial cohesion should not be imposed from above in a dogmatic manner 
through narrowly-defined territorial priorities. As the Presidency conclusions on the Fifth 
Cohesion Report put it:  
Territ orial  cohesion should be t aken int o account  in programming and 
implementat ion, as a comprehensive and int egrat ed concept , leaving it  t o t he 
Member St ates at  t he appropriate level , t o def ine t he most  suit able level  of  
int ervent ion, t hat  t akes due account  of  dif ferences among t errit ories wit h a view 
t o promot ing t he harmonious and balanced development  of  t he European Union. 
The risk is that territorial cohesion will not be systematically addressed in the post-2013 
strategies. In the absence of a firm EU commitment to the operationalisation of the 
concept, solutions could include the publication of a toolkit or guidance at EU level (as 
proposed by Hungary), or further clarification through the EU’s Territorial Agenda for 2020 
(France). The ongoing work of ESPON could be useful in this respect. However, on the basis 
of the 2007-13 applied and targeted analyses reviewed for this study (Annex 1), it is clear 
that, while ESPON studies have provided a rich source of data on the nature of territorial 
problems in the EU, the policy implications proposed tend to be rather bland and generic. 
Recognition of this by the Member States is evident in the recent Presidency Conclusions, 
calling for improvements in the policy relevance/utility of ESPON outputs.66 
5.2 Strategic Coherence and Programming 
The Commission’s proposed changes to the strategic planning framework in the Budget 2020 
Communication and Fifth Cohesion Report mainly aim to ensure a greater focus on the 
Europe 2020 strategy. The basic structure would involve a progression of the existing 
system of Community Strategic Guidelines, National Strategic Reference Frameworks and 
Operational programmes, as follows.  
x A Common Strategic Framework would translate the objectives and headline targets 
of Europe 2020 into investment priorities. The framework would be more 
comprehensive than the current guidelines, extending beyond the ERDF, CF and ESF 
to the EAFRD and EFF and also cover coordination with other EU policies. To speed up 
the approval process and ensure strategic coherence, the Commission proposes that 
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the strategy is adopted by the Commission, rather than requiring Council approval as 
under the CSG. 
x Development and Investment Partnership Contracts would set out for each Member 
State the investment priorities, allocation of national and EU resources between 
priority areas and programmes. The main difference with respect to the current NSRF 
would be the inclusion of conditionalities and targets based on agreed indicators.  
x Operational Programmes would remain the main management tool. Greater 
thematic concentration on Europe 2020 priorities would be achieved by limiting the 
number of priority axes in programmes, particularly in more developed regions, or by 
introducing compulsory priorities. In the Budget 2020 Communication the Commission 
proposes that Transition regions and Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
regions should focus the entire allocation of Cohesion policy funding (except for the 
ESF) on energy efficiency and renewable energy (representing at least 20 percent of 
programme allocations), and SME competitiveness and innovation, while Convergence 
regions would be able to fund a wider range of priorities reflecting their needs. 67 
Unlike the present period, integrated programming would be encouraged through 
multi-fund programmes including the designation of a ‘lead fund’ where appropriate.  
Notwithstanding the widespread support for the strategic alignment of Cohesion Policy with 
other EU policies and Europe 2020, national experts have raised several key concerns.68 
First, the obligations arising from the Partnership Contract may increase administrative 
burdens and costs, particularly if they necessitate the establishment of an additional 
management layer at national level. Related, the contractual approach may be difficult to 
implement at national level in regionalised or federal countries where economic 
development competences are devolved. Third, the requirements for greater thematic 
concentration and alignment with National Reform Programmes may reduce the flexibility 
to devise and implement tailor-made programmes. Fourth, ownership of the CSF may be 
diminished if the Member States are not involved in the development and adoption of the 
document. 
There is widespread support among Member States for the introduction of a Common 
Strategic Framework.  Many national responses to the Fifth Cohesion Report consultation 
underlined the potential for greater strategic coherence across EU Funds and policies 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, 
Sweden), reiterated in the Council Conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion Report.69 Links with 
rural development were highlighted as being especially important by some (e.g. France and 
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Slovakia), while others emphasised the need to build bridges with other EU policies 
(Austria, Germany, Portugal, Latvia, Poland, Portugal). Issues that require further 
clarification include the relationship between the CSF and the EU Territorial Agenda 
(France, Italy, Poland), and the legal status and force of the document (Czech Republic). By 
contrast, one Member State rejected the need for a CSF altogether (Finland), arguing that 
it adds an unnecessary strategic layer and would increase coordination complexity. 
National positions on the Partnership Contract were similarly mixed. Again, one Member 
State rejected the need for change, arguing that the current NSRF is fit for purpose 
(Netherlands). Elsewhere, there were different views on the appropriate reach of the 
contract, with some countries supporting the idea of extending its scope beyond Cohesion 
Policy (Cyprus, France, Hungary, Poland), especially to Rural Development and Fisheries 
policies (Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia), while others arguing that it should primarily or 
only cover Cohesion Policy (Czech Republic, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg). Key concerns are that the Partnership Contract should not introduce another 
management layer or increase administrative burdens (Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Sweden) and that it should respect the subsidiarity principle (Belgium, Germany).  
Many countries consider that further clarification of the contract’s content and 
requirements is needed before a firm position can be taken (Cyprus, France, Finland, 
Germany, Hungary), a point that was underlined in the Council Conclusions.70 For instance, 
there is a lack of clarity on the relationship with National Reform Programmes (Belgium, 
Hungary, Netherlands), which according to some Member States should not represent the 
sole reference framework for Partnership Contracts or Cohesion Policy (Belgium, Germany, 
Slovakia). As highlighted in a recent High-Level Meeting under the Hungarian Presidency: 
‘the NRPs differ from the development strategy of Cohesion Policy in nature, approach, 
function and time scope.’71  
Turning to thematic concentration, there is widespread support for concentrating funding 
on a few Europe 2020 priorities (Austria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom). In line with the 
Commission’s justification, the Council Conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion Report concurred 
on the need to ‘achieve a critical mass and maximise the impact and the visibility of 
cohesion policy investments as well as help to reinforce European added value.’72 Despite 
the apparent consensus on the principle and rationale for thematic concentration, national 
authorities have strong reservations about the imposition of a top-down, prescriptive 
approach focusing on narrow thematic priorities relating exclusively to Europe 2020 
objectives and targets. The need for flexibility to adapt EU priorities to national / regional 
contexts was underlined in virtually every Member State submission to the consultation and 
in the Council Conclusions. Related, the proposal to introduce obligatory priorities has little 
support, with the exceptions of the Italian and the Dutch responses. It is considered 
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necessary to recognise the diversity in absorption capacities (Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland) and 
to provide scope for other priorities that are less prominent in the Europe 2020 strategy: 
basic infrastructure needs remain paramount in less-developed countries (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia), 73  remote areas (Finland) and outermost regions 
(France), while culture and tourism is regarded as an important development priority in 
Greece. There is also resistance to the idea of limiting the menu of priorities under the 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective (e.g. France and Germany).  
Some Member States expressed concern that thematic concentration may hamper the 
pursuit of territorial priorities (Belgium, Greece, Latvia) or an integrated approach 
(Belgium, France, Greece, Sweden); many responses underlined the need to avoid the 
‘sectoralisation’ of Cohesion Policy by, for instance, providing incentives or freedom to use 
multi-fund programmes (Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Sweden). This proposal 
was reiterated in the Presidency Conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion Report, which called for 
the ESF, ERDF and CF to work together in a more integrated manner.  
5.3 Conditionalities and Incentives 
The idea of reinforcing the use of conditionalities and incentives in the post-2013 Cohesion 
Policy was first suggested by the Commission in its proposals for reforming EU economic 
governance in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis. 74  It proposed making 
Cohesion policy disbursements conditional on structural and institutional reforms and to 
introduce a new system of financial sanctions related to fiscal policy rules. The document 
also suggested that a performance reserve could be established and that co-financing rates 
could be modulated to incentivise better performance. These ideas were further clarified in 
the Budget Review Communication, the Fifth Cohesion Report and the papers and 
discussions in the High-level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy as well as a specific EU 
Task Force on Conditionalities.  
As stated in the Fifth Cohesion Report, the main aim of the conditionality proposals is to 
‘help countries and regions to tackle the problems that past experience has been show to 
particularly relevant to policy implementation.’ The Commission has identified several 
principles that are required for an effective framework of conditionalities - they should be 
enforceable, non-prescriptive, credible and shared75 - and has suggested several different 
types of conditionality that could be introduced or reinforced.76  
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x Ex-ante conditionality would aim to ensure preconditions for effective support by 
making allocations at the programming stage conditional on the transposition of EU 
legislation (e.g. water pricing, small business regulation), the existence of strategic 
plans or frameworks (innovation, research, climate change), the efficiency of project 
planning (in transport, energy) and institutions (budget planning, public 
procurement). During the preparation of the partnership contracts and programmes, 
each Member State would carry out a self-assessment aimed at checking whether it 
fulfils the prerequisites for each priority theme. When the programmes are being 
negotiated with the Commission, the Member States would commit to taking the 
necessary measures to fulfil the conditionalities. Until this is the case, the 
Commission could delay programme adoption, freeze payments or, following mid-
term review, require a transfer of resources to another priority. 
x Structural conditionality would make disbursements to Member States conditional on 
the implementation of the structural reforms specified in their National Reform 
Programmes (i.e. flexicurity policies and education and training policies under the 
European Social Fund). Conditionality would be compulsory in the event of a Member 
State being the subject of a Council recommendation under the Europe 2020 Strategy 
surveillance process in an area directly related to Cohesion policy. The Member State 
would then commit to a schedule and a deadline for implementing the reform. 
Funding would be suspended or cancelled if the reforms were not carried out in time. 
x Macroeconomic conditionality links disbursement to Member States with compliance 
of Stability and Growth pact criteria. This would extend the rules currently 
applicable to the Cohesion Fund to the other Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF), 
implying that all countries would be treated equally by the rule (not just those 
eligible for the Cohesion Fund).  
x Performance conditionality would reward programmes that progress towards the 
targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy. A five percent share of the budget would be 
held back in a reserve at EU level and allocated, during a mid-term review, to the 
Member States and regions whose programmes have contributed most to these 
targets compared to their starting-points. 
The discussions with national experts in the Conditionality Task Force suggest that there is 
general agreement on the need to improve the performance framework in Cohesion policy. 
Nevertheless, a range of perceived challenges and objections emerged. 
The strongest opposition concerns the proposals on structural reform conditionalities, 
particularly the idea of linking disbursements to country-specific recommendations and to 
the annual cycle of the European semester. Participants noted that the national 
recommendations would have too wide a scope, covering areas that are not directly linked 
to Cohesion policy (where the EU only has soft coordination competences), which may take 
several programme periods to resolve, while the annual cycle of the European semester is 
not aligned with the Cohesion policy timeframe of programming, implementation and 
reporting. Related, conditionalities should not raise the overall administrative burden. 
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Ex-ante conditionalities are viewed more positively, but they would need to focus on 
improving effectiveness in Cohesion policy, have a direct link to Cohesion policy 
investments, be limited in number, respect subsidiarity and be based on a joint agreement 
between the Member States and the Commission. As regards their application, the main 
points raised were that: clear criteria are needed for assessment; the Commission’s role 
requires clarification; a sectoralised implementation model should be avoided; and 
administrative burdens should not increase.  
The Conditionality Task Force did not examine the macroeconomic or performance 
conditionality proposals, but national experts did provide some reactions in the High-Level 
Group on the future of Cohesion Policy.77 The introduction of an EU performance reserve 
was questioned by some experts, preferring instead an optional national reserve as at 
present. On macroeconomic conditionality, the responses were mixed. For some, the 
extension of the provisions to all Cohesion policy funds would be a positive move in terms 
of equality of treatment for all countries, yet others highlighted that the proposals would 
exacerbate the problems of indebted countries, would penalise regions for decisions outside 
their competence and would run counter to the Treaty objective of cohesion.   
Similar views can also be found in the national position papers. Several Member States 
explicitly rejected the idea of macroeconomic conditionalities (Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
United Kingdom). The main drawbacks identified were that poorer Member States and 
regions would be disproportionately affected (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland), that sanctions 
would worsens the fiscal position of the country and that regions would be unfairly 
punished for national behaviour (Hungary). By contrast, other countries offered support for 
macroeconomic conditionalities (Estonia, Germany), particularly if they are applied to all 
EU funds (Austria, Finland, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia). As noted, a joint letter issued by 
France and Germany in August 2011 on economic and fiscal governance also supported for 
the use of macroeconomic conditionalities. By contrast, a recent paper by the German 
authorities has adopted a more cautious stance on the introduction of ex-ante or structural 
conditionalities (Box 8). 
Box 8: German Federal and Länder paper on internal conditionalities 
 
The German authorities paper of June 2011 on conditionalities states that they are open to the 
introduction of conditionalities as long as: 
 
x the conditionalities are clearly defined ex-ante, only apply to areas closely connected with 
Cohesion policy funding, are tailored to raising the programmes’ efficiency, do not interfere with 
the competences of Member States or regions, and respect the principle of subsidiarity; 
 
x Member States retain the authority and responsibility for carrying out their own economic and 
labour-market policy reforms, particularly their right to decide on specific measures and the right 
policy mix; 
 
x the country-specific recommendations continue to be just that, and do not acquire a binding 
nature for which there is no legal basis – an issue which could arise if Structural Funds were 
withheld from a country deemed not to have implemented the recommendations adequately; 
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x the concept allows public-sector budgets and multi-annual funding programmes to be planned 
reliably and does not threaten the implementation or finalisation of projects lined up for the 
funding programmes; 
 
x the efficiency of long-term funding programmes and development strategies is not diminished by 
the annual mechanisms for surveillance of the country-specific recommendations and National 
Reform Programmes. 
 
Further, it states that they would reject conditionalities if:  
 
x the Structural Funds were used merely as a lever to achieve political aims in other areas (this also 
applies to the implementation of EU Directives);  
 
x the European Commission were to gain de facto authority to decide whether the country-specific 
recommendations … have been implemented adequately… or by seeking to make the disbursement 
of Structural Funds subject to its assessment 
 
   
While many countries stated a clear preference for incentives over sanctions (Cyprus, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Portugal), it was also argued that a performance 
reserve should be optional at Member State level or that it was not necessary (Bulgaria, 
Finland, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Spain). Aside from 
the administrative burden (Austria, Estonia), there would be risks associated with planning 
or financial uncertainty (Estonia, United Kingdom), the rewarding of the wealthiest regions 
and Member States with better performance (Latvia, United Kingdom) and the selection of 
easily achievable goals / targets (Czech Republic, Netherlands). The main methodological 
challenges are that performance would be difficult to compare across Member States 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia) and the inability to measure 
meaningful results in the short-term (Greece, Latvia, Poland). Lastly, if such a reserve were 
introduced, key conditions are that it does not prioritise spending over quality, lead to risk 
aversion (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Sweden) or is assessed solely on the basis of 
Europe 2020 objectives and targets (Czech Republic, Italy).  
5.4 Monitoring, Evaluation and Capacity  
In the Fifth Cohesion Report the Commission set out several ideas on how to improve the 
approach to monitoring and evaluation, subsequently fleshed out in more detail in a 
working paper presented to the Member States in DG Regio’s evaluation network.78  
x Programme objectives: each priority/sub-priority should identify one or a limited 
number of result indicators that best express the intended change, the direction of the 
desired change, a quantified target or a range, and a baseline. Output indicators should 
cover all parts of a programme, use indicators from the list of common EU indicators and 
be linked to categories of expenditure. Targets should be set for the end of the 
programming period. Output baselines would not be required. 
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x Annual Implementation Report (AIR): aside from financial implementation data, AIRs 
should provide cumulative values for output indicators from the second year including 
actual and expected values. Progress should be reported towards the desired result. A 
qualitative analysis should be provided of the contribution towards the change of result 
indicators, using financial data, output indicators, managerial knowledge and 
evaluations. Analysis of why the objectives / priorities are being achieved or not should 
be provided. The Fifth Cohesion Report notes that progress reporting would be aligned 
with the Europe 2020 governance cycle, including a regular political debate in Council 
and Parliament. 
x Ex ante evaluation: should appraise the justification for the thematic priorities and 
their consistency with the Europe 2020 strategy, the Common Strategic Framework and 
partnership contract; the relevance and clarity of the proposed result indicators and 
output indicators; the plausibility of the targets and for the explanation of the 
contribution of the outputs to the results; consistency between financial resources and 
the targets for output indicators; administrative capacity for management and 
implementation; the quality of the monitoring system, and how data will be gathered to 
carry out evaluations. 
x Evaluation during the programming period: theory-based evaluation, counterfactual 
evaluation and implementation evaluation should play a role, with an increased focus on 
the first two. Implementation evaluations are more likely to be useful in the early stages 
of implementation. Evaluation capturing the effect of priorities and looking into their 
theory of change are more likely to occur at a later stage. Each priority should be 
covered at least once by an impact evaluation. A summary evaluation in 2020 could 
collate the main evaluation findings.  
x Evaluation plan: after programme approval, the Member State or region would adopt an 
evaluation plan specifying an indicative list of evaluations and rationale; methods and 
data requirements; provisions for data collection; an evaluation timetable; the human 
resources involved; and the indicative budget for evaluation. The Monitoring Committee 
would review the evaluation plan once per year and adopt necessary amendments.  
x Ex post evaluation: would continue to be the Commission’s responsibility but facilitated 
by evaluations of Member States during the programming period, especially by the 
Member States’ summary of evaluations undertaken. 
x Transparency: All evaluations should be made public, preferably via the internet. 
English abstracts are recommended to allow for exchange of evaluation findings across 
countries. 
European Policies Research Paper No. 81  European Policies Research Centre 59
A Budget and Cohesion Policy for Europe 2020: Let the Negotiations Begin 
European Policies Research Paper No. 81  European Policies Research Centre 60
Monitoring, reporting and evaluation was discussed in several HLG meetings on the future of 
Cohesion policy, including the work of a team of academics and experts commissioned by 
DG Regio to provide recommendations on indicators and targets (Box 9).79  
Box 9: Towards a new system of monitoring and evaluation in EU Cohesion Policy 
 
Coordinated by Fabrizio Barca and Philip McCann, the first note produced by the group proposes a 
system of outcome indicators, drawing on previous experiences and emphasising the need to ensure a 
more results-driven approach. The aim would be to create a system where Member States and regions 
could choose appropriate performance indicators according to agreed methodological principles. Both 
outcomes and measureable aspects of these outcomes would be chosen at the programme design 
stage and then monitored and reported periodically. The proposed approach would need to be 
accompanied by increased thematic concentration and the establishment of baselines and targets in 
order to become an effective managerial tool. The main proposals are: 
x to clearly distinguish outcome/results (collapsed into outcome) from outputs and express the 
objectives in the programming documents and at project level in terms of changes in outcome 
measured by indicators chosen by Member States and assessed, whenever possible, with reference 
to explicit targets; 
x to ensure the quality of outcome indicators through adherence to clear-cut methodological 
principles that need to be met by these indicators; 
x to ensure that Member States report progress of outcome indicators; and 
x to reinforce ex-ante and prospective planning of policy impact assessment and clearly 
distinguishing it from the monitoring of changes in outcome indicators. 
 
Source: Barca and McCann (2011) op.cit . 
The Barca/McCann paper received a mixed reaction from national policy-makers. While 
welcoming the general thrust of the proposed system, the main message was that sufficient 
flexibility is needed to allow Member States and regions to choose the indicators most 
appropriate to their socio-economic situation and development priorities. Concerns were 
expressed about the breadth of indicators, relating to themes that go beyond the Treaty 
goals of cohesion, or an overly sectoral/thematic approach, and about the potential 
administrative burden for public authorities and beneficiaries of additional reporting. It was 
underlined that auditors should not use the system as a punitive tool that leads to financial 
corrections, and that a shift away from the focus on spending and control would be 
required to free up resources for designing and monitoring indicators and targets. Some 
policy-makers would like greater proportionality, requiring indicator choices to be informed 
by the cost of their application, and greater support for administrative capacity.  
The need for annual high-level political debate on Cohesion Policy was supported by some 
policy-makers in the High-Level Group, potentially including a more active role for the 
European Parliament. On the other hand, some participants consider that the existing 
structures (e.g. Informal Ministerial meetings) are sufficient or that EU debates should 
remain flexible rather than following a rigid timetable. 
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Feedback on monitoring and evaluation in the national responses to the Fifth Cohesion 
report consultation was patchy, presumably because of the rather generic nature of the 
proposals contained in the Cohesion Report. There was recognition of the need for 
measurable, clear, uniform indicators and targets (notably, Denmark, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia) and some support for common EU indicators (Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Netherlands, Latvia). Yet, it was also noted that EU indicators should not limit the 
choice of programme priorities (Cyprus) and must be feasible to implement in practice 
(Austria). Few responses offered an opinion on the idea of stronger performance reporting, 
aside from Hungary’s call for AIRs and Strategic Reports to be raised to a higher strategic 
level.  
In line with the Commission’s evaluation proposals, some countries would welcome 
reinforced ex-ante evaluations (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia), obligatory evaluation plans 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, United Kingdom) and a greater evaluation focus on 
results to support performance (Austria, Cyprus, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland). Other 
proposals included more Member State involvement in the Commission’s ex-post evaluation 
(Hungary), greater support for strengthening evaluation capacities (Italy), requiring better 
evaluations of European Territorial Cooperation programmes (Italy) and avoiding the 
creation of new administrative burdens on evaluation (Germany, United Kingdom). The 
need for balance between administrative obligations and a stronger performance focus was 
reiterated in the Council conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion Report, which acknowledged the 
need for:  
x a common understanding of performance, including a methodology of its 
assessment established in advance; 
x a strong and dedicated focus on the actual outcomes and results of the policy 
underpinned by the improvement of current evaluation, monitoring and indicator 
systems, concentrating on a limited number of well-defined, easily measurable 
targets and a limited set of core indicators, without increasing the overall burden 
of reporting; and 
x efficient programme-design and institutional frameworks, while making sure that 
administrative burden remains as limited as possible. 
The need for institutional capacity to enhance the policy’s performance orientation is 
well-recognised. The most prominent Commission proposal in this respect is the 
introduction of ex-ante conditionalities on administrative and institutional capacity, 
including implementation assessments. In addition, the Cohesion Report states that funding 
would continue to be available for developing administrative and institutional capacity, but 
that eligibility would be extended to all countries and regions (that is, outside convergence 
regions and cohesion countries). Opposition to an interventionist Commission role in 
developing institutional capacity is evident in the Council conclusions on the Fifth Cohesion 
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Report, which states that the main priority should be to ensure that there is ‘enough 
flexibility’ for Member States and regions to fund capacity building ‘where relevant’.80 
5.5 Shared Management 
The strapline for the Fifth Cohesion Report proposals for reforming the assurance system is 
a ‘streamlined and simpler delivery model,’ while ‘greater flexibility’ and ‘greater 
reduction of the risk of error’ are identified as core priorities in the Commission’s Budget 
reform proposals on Cohesion policy 81  The key proposals include changes to the 
management and control system, reforms to the reimbursement methods, the extension of 
simplified costs options and more proportionality and differentiation. 
5.5.1 Management and control systems  
The key principles of the proposed changes to the delivery system are derived from the 
amendments to the Financial Regulation relating to all shared management policies, which 
would essentially apply the existing model used for the agricultural funds to Cohesion 
policy.  
x Accredited body: An accreditation process would be established for the main 
management body, which would assume sole responsibility for the management and 
control of the funds. Separate managing and certification authorities would not be 
needed as the system is based on two control layers, the accredited body (fusing 
managing and certification functions) and an audit body (for independent audit and 
control). There would be no restrictions on the number of accredited bodies in a 
country (i.e. a single body at national level or a body per programme or region) and 
the body’s tasks could still be delegated to intermediate bodies. The main difference 
is that overall responsibility would be concentrated in the accredited body. 
x Accreditation process: The objective of the accreditation would be to provide ex-
ante assurance on the set-up of management and control systems on the basis of an 
independent audit, as was the case under the compliance assessment. The main 
difference would be that the Commission’s role would be reduced, either by not 
requiring its validation or by limiting its involvement e.g. to cases with high risk due 
to the failure to provide assurance during this period, or where significant changes to 
systems are introduced. Detailed rules and criteria would be needed in the 
regulations to determine minimum standards for the approval of management and 
control systems and to establish when and how the Commission can intervene in the 
approval process. The underlying rationale is to increase the commitment by Member 
States to assurance and to simplify the process.  
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x Annual management declarations: The accredited body responsible for managing 
programmes (i.e. the current Managing Authority) would provide the Commission by 
1st February each year with: (a) accounts of payments and control activity; (b) a 
management declaration on the reliability of systems and the legality and regularity 
of expenditure; and (c) an independent audit opinion. At present only some of this 
information is provided annually (e.g. annual statements on recoveries and the audit 
opinion, but with different timing requirements), while a management declaration is 
not required. The rationale for this proposal is to link annual assurance from national 
authorities more explicitly to the expenditure of the financial year covered by the 
annual activity report and budget discharge process at EU level. 
x Annual clearance of accounts and rolling closure: The approval by the Commission 
of the above documents would provide the basis for an annual clearance of accounts, 
which would facilitate a rolling partial closure of programmes. At present, closure 
takes place after the programme period has ended. Although partial closure is 
possible, it is not mandatory. The main advantage of the proposals is timely 
clearance of accounts (strengthening the discharge exercise), while a rolling closure 
approach could increase legal certainty and reduce the audit trail burden associated 
with rules on the retention of documents. 
The requirements of this proposed model prompted several concerns among national policy-
makers in the High-Level Group discussions. First, complexity, administrative burden and 
costs could increase, as the model involves substantial organisational change and requires 
additional reporting obligations. Second, and related, the proposed timetables for reporting 
to the Commission are tight and could be difficult to follow. Third, the requirement for a 
management declaration could be problematic in some countries due to the dispersed 
distribution of responsibilities and because the signatories may not be in a position to take 
full responsibility. Last, the introduction of the two-layer control framework may reduce 
the reliability of existing systems in some Member States, where the certifying authority 
provides a useful and effective check on the first level controls of the managing authority. 
As regards political feasibility, there seems to be little support among the Member States 
for the changes. In fact, they were arguably the most criticised aspect of the Commission’s 
proposals (Box 10). The only country to offer (qualified) support was the United Kingdom, 
noting that there were potential efficiency and rationalisation savings from a common, 
integrated system for financial management, audit and control across all the shared 
management Funds. However, it also underlined that change would have to be managed 
carefully to avoid disruption and that it could only support the proposals if they were 
accompanied by a more risk-based and proportionate approach to financial controls with 
reduced administrative burdens. 
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 Box 10 National Positions on management and control systems proposals 
 
x Proposals could be beneficial in the long-term under specific conditions (UK) 
x Stability needed rather than reform (AT, BE, CZ, DK, ES, FR, LU 
x Existing rules and practice should be rigorously evaluated (DK, PT, SE) 
x The rules need to be ready early and prepared with MS (CZ, HU) 
x Major concerns among many Member States 
-  increased administrative burden (AT, ES, IE, HU, IT, PL, SK) 
-  increased uncertainty and risks (DE, ES, HU) 
-  may decrease assurance (DE), particularly by eliminating the certification authority (HU)  
-  limited or no simplification and proportionality (FR, IE) 
-  no added value or evidence base for changes (AT, CZ, ES, FR, HU, SK) 
-  disregards CP specificities (AT, BE, IT), i.e. multi-annual approach (IT, SK), ETC OPs (HU) 
-  no account taken of current improvements in systems and learning (FR, GR, HU, IE, PL,
 PT, SK) 
-  unrealistic deadlines for conducting audits, finalising findings and reporting (AT, FR, HU, 
 PL)  
-  enforces major organisational change unnecessarily (DE, PL, SK) 
-  duplication problems as the system would have to co-exist with the current one (PL, SK). 
-  operational difficulties with annual declarations in highly devolved systems (FR) 
 
 
5.5.2 Reimbursements 
The Cohesion Report puts forward three options for reforming the approach to 
reimbursements. First, they could be paid by the Commission on the basis of payments 
made by the Member States to beneficiaries, again following existing arrangements for 
the agricultural policy funds. At present, national authorities are not required to reimburse 
the public contribution to beneficiaries prior to certifying the expenditure to the 
Commission, although it is standard practice in some countries. 
The rationale behind the proposal is to encourage Member States to speed up payments and 
to incentivise stronger checks of expenditure before submitting claims. The main drawback 
is that it could lead to decreased liquidity in some countries, unless it is accompanied with 
increased advances from the Commission. Related, there could also be a greater risk of 
decommitment, if domestic procedures or approaches to administering and transferring 
committed funding to beneficiaries are not expedited.  
Political support for this proposal seems to be limited. Only one Member State offered 
support in the Cohesion Report consultation, noting that the idea should be given 
consideration (Latvia). Several other countries expressed disapproval (Belgium, Cyprus, 
France), but most others did not offer an opinion. 
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A second proposal is the introduction of output or results-based disbursements for OPs or 
parts of OPs, potentially in the form of ‘joint action plans’.82 The underlying rationale is to 
reinforce the results-based approach by increasing the incentives and pressure on 
programme administrators and beneficiaries to deliver outputs. The main drawbacks are 
threefold. First, liquidity difficulties could arise, as payments would be withheld until 
targets are reached. Second, there would be methodological challenges in establishing and 
measuring reliable targets and in assessing the causal links between actions and 
outputs/results. Third, the costs of programme administration would rise because of the 
need to establish, negotiate and report on targets, as well as increasing the reporting 
burden on beneficiaries.  
This proposal received limited attention in the national responses to the reform 
consultation questions on assurance, although it is closely related to the issue of 
conditionalities discussed in detail earlier. Those countries that did respond provided a 
mixed assessment. For instance, Germany was sceptical on the basis of the drawbacks 
identified above. By contrast, the Dutch response argued that it was a necessary condition 
for moving towards a results-based system, on the assumption that it would be 
accompanied by a shift towards performance auditing and away from financial checking and 
auditing of real costs and detailed eligibility rules. Yet, other countries note that eligibility 
of costs, application of procurement rules and other principles would still have to be 
verified (Estonia). 
A performance shift is implicit in the rationale of the final proposal on reimbursements, 
which is to promote the simplified costs approach. Specific measures or options on how 
this can be achieved in practice are not provided in the Cohesion Report, but the principle 
does offer potential for increasing simplification and shifting the financial management, 
control and audit focus to outputs instead of the costs of projects.  
As regards political feasibility, a limited number of Member States expressed clear support 
for an extension of the simplified costs options in the reform consultation (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Slovakia). Mirroring discussions in the high-level group on the future of Cohesion 
Policy, several proposals were put forward on how this could be supported:  
x by agreeing, at EU level, standard rates by types of expenditure at the start of the 
period for all Member States and only requiring justification to the Commission if 
the rate is exceeded (Belgium);  
x by relaxing the requirements for small projects, such as allowing higher ceilings 
(e.g. €100,000 instead of €50,000) for lump sums (France); and 
x by providing flexibility to apply the approaches used in other EU policy areas 
(Cyprus), e.g. the standard unit costs used in EU research policy (Framework 
Programmes) for research and innovation grants.  
                                                 
82 European Commission (2011) A budget  for Europe 2020 - Part II: Policy fiches, COM(2011)500 final 
of 29 June 2011, Brussels. 
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5.5.3 Proport ionality  
The Commission suggests that it would be useful to examine how control measures could be 
made more cost-effective and risk-based in order to improve their effectiveness and 
efficiency while ensuring adequate coverage at a reasonable cost.  
Again, no specific options were put forward in the Cohesion Report, although the 
proportionality principle does provide a promising avenue for pursuing administrative 
simplification measures. A potential drawback, implicit in the nature of the principle, is 
that it will lead to unequal treatment, particularly if it is applied on the basis of the size of 
financial allocations to programmes as is the case at the moment (i.e. by providing more 
flexibility in richer countries / regions and stricter obligations for the main beneficiaries). 
This issue of fairness was underlined in several of the national contributions to the Cohesion 
Report (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy), yet the need for greater proportionality has 
universal support in the national position papers. The critical question, for which there is 
no political consensus, is how this can be done. The main criteria proposed for determining 
the application of the principle include not only the financial size of the programme 
(Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden), but also the size, type, 
form and targets of assistance (Bulgaria, France, Italy) or track record / risk (Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, United Kingdom). 
An approach based on risk or track record to differentiation is implicit in the notion of a 
‘single-audit’ model. As a guiding principle for reforming the assurance model, this concept 
commands widespread support because it implies that greater reliance and trust would be 
placed on national systems or, at a minimum, that there should be more coordination 
between the different levels in the system (e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Finland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden and United Kingdom). 
In this vein, several countries called for the concept of ‘contracts of confidence’ to be 
reintroduced (e.g. Estonia, France), implying a more legally-binding commitment to the 
single-audit model, while others proposed specific limits to Commission audits, for 
example: reducing its scope of action to completed projects (Bulgaria); to Member States’ 
systems (Finland); or to performance audits (Poland).  
5.5.4 Tolerable risk of error  
The concept of Tolerable Risk of Error was first suggested by the Court of Auditors in its 
2004 opinion on the Single Audit Model.83 It acknowledged that different areas of policy 
expenditure are subject to different risks profiles due to their management mode, the 
nature of the actions and the interaction with final beneficiaries. The implication is that 
the current threshold of two percent may need to be increased for some policy areas to 
reflect these differences. The Commission has included the concept in the draft Financial 
Regulation and proposals were made for several policy areas in 2010 (rural development, 
                                                 
83 Opinion 2/2004 of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities on the single audit model 
(and a proposal for a Community internal control framework), OJ C107, 30.4.2004, p. 1. 
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research and energy transport policies). At time of writing, proposals for Cohesion policy 
were expected shortly. 
As noted, the rationale for introducing different levels of materiality for different policy 
areas is that variation is necessary to reflect the different levels of complexity and the 
associated costs of the additional controls that would be required to reduce error levels to 
acceptable levels. The main drawback from a Cohesion Policy perspective is that it could 
reduce the incentive to undertake more fundamental simplification of the existing 
regulatory framework, which is arguably the main reason for the high level of errors and 
the administrative burden associated with the assurance model.  
Although proposals or consultation questions on the tolerable risk of error were not 
included in Fifth Cohesion Report, several Member States did offer support for 
differentiation across policy areas or an increase in the threshold for Cohesion Policy in 
their responses (e.g. Greece, Hungary, Latvia). By contrast, one country cautioned against 
reform in the absence of a through assessment of the current regime (United Kingdom).  
Further, it was argued that this debate should not detract from the simplification agenda, 
which must remain a top priority if the underlying structural problems in the assurance 
model are to be addressed (Hungary, United Kingdom). Other proposals included the need 
for more clarity and accuracy in the definitions of error, irregularity and fraud (Hungary, 
Slovakia).  
5.6 Added Value 
The budget review placed the question of European added value at the heart of the debate 
on the future of all EU expenditure policies. More recently, a working paper accompanying 
the Budget 2020 Communication has defined European added value as ‘the value resulting 
from an EU intervention which is additional to the value that would have been otherwise 
created by Member State action alone.’84 Key criteria for determining added value are: 
x effectiveness: where EU action is the only way to get results to create missing links, 
avoid fragmentation, and realise the potential of a border-free Europe; 
x efficiency: where the EU offers better value for money, because externalities can be 
addressed, resources or expertise can be pooled, an action can be better 
coordinated; and 
x synergy: where EU action is necessary to complement, stimulate, and leverage action 
to reduce disparities, raise standards, and create synergies. 
The paper notes that EU added value is particularly prominent in areas of spending linked 
to core competences (e.g. agriculture, where more than 70 percent of spending is at EU 
level); closing missing links (e.g. cross border infrastructures in energy, transport and ICT); 
                                                 
84 European Commission (2011) The added value of  t he EU budget , Commission Staff Working Paper 
accompanying the document Commission Communication, A budget for Europe 2020, SEC(2011) 867 
final, 29.6.2011, Brussels. 
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and where objectives would be difficult to reach through national action (e.g. large-scale 
research infrastructures or the combating the consequences of climate change). In the 
chapter on Cohesion policy, added value is discussed in general terms and linked to:  
x the key effects of Cohesion Policy 
o redistributive transfers to poorer regions;  
o the contribution to EU priorities for growth, jobs and sustainable development;  
o spillover effects via increased trade flows;  
o institutional/administrative change, promoting long-term planning, 
partnerships, monitoring and evaluation culture, and reinforcing control and 
audit capacities; combating the effects of the crisis through anti-cyclical 
spending.  
x contribution to convergence, underlining the impacts on GDP and on infrastructure 
outputs and results in less developed regions;  
x support for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth across the EU;  
x territorial cooperation through joint programmes addressing issues that cut across 
national/regional boundaries and bring EU citizens closer together; and  
x social cohesion support through the ESF, which supports common objectives, 
leverages funding and provides financial stability.  
As regards reform proposals, the Budget 2020 Communication states that the Commission 
‘proposes to strengthen the focus on results and EU added-value by tying cohesion policy 
more systematically to the Europe 2020 objectives’, particularly by concentrating on a 
smaller number of priorities, closer monitoring of progress and through the establishment 
of conditionalities. The Fifth Cohesion Report conclusions contain a specific section entitled 
‘enhancing the European added value of Cohesion policy’, to be pursued through:  
x reinforced strategic programming; 
x increased thematic concentration; 
x strengthening performance via conditionalities and incentives, including revisions to 
additionality and co-financing; 
x improving evaluation, performance and results; and 
x supporting the use of new financial instruments. 
As some of these proposals have already been examined earlier, the focus here will be on 
new financial instruments, additionality and co-financing. In addition, reform ideas on the 
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partnership principle will be examined, being one of the most commonly cited areas of 
added value in Cohesion Policy.  
5.6.1 New financial instruments  
To encourage the use of new financial instruments the Commission’s proposals envisage: 
x greater clarity and differentiation between rules governing grant-based financing and 
rules governing repayable forms of assistance, especially on eligibility of expenditure 
and audits; and 
x extending the scope and scale of financial engineering instruments, particularly for 
generic forms of business support which should be primarily channelled through 
financial engineering schemes. 
The discussions in the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy indicate that 
national policy-makers recognise the added value of non-grant financial instruments, but do 
not want to see this type of support replacing grants in specific policy domains such as 
business support. Where there is more agreement with the Commission is on the need for 
simpler, clearer and more flexible rules (particularly regarding the scope of actions and 
geographic coverage), potentially involving the establishment of a separate set of rules for 
financial instruments. There is also widespread support for setting up a European technical 
support facility as well as enhanced dissemination and sharing of good practice.  
Some of these views were reiterated in the Fifth Cohesion Report consultation. The most 
commonly raised point is the need to review the complexity of the financial engineering 
rules and reduce administrative burdens (France, Germany, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom), including an assessment of current practice 
(Belgium, Slovakia). Several countries consider that the choice and balance of financial 
instruments should remain a domestic decision (Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Poland) 
and stressed that direct grants for business support remain important (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Poland). To support planning and reduce legal uncertainty, it was 
underlined that the new rules should be available in a timely manner (Belgium) and should 
include auditors in the drafting process (Germany).  
A more critical stance on the Commission’s proposals is taken by Austria, which argues that 
there is no stakeholder demand or evaluation evidence for increasing the use of financial 
engineering instruments and that it would in any case involve more administrative burdens.  
Alternative proposals raised in the submissions include the extension of simplified costs 
options to new financial instruments (Slovakia) and to use the instruments to incentivise an 
integrated approach across the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund (Poland).  
5.6.2 Addit ionality and co-financing 
A task force has been set up at EU level to review financial additionality reform ideas. 
Although the group’s findings have not been made public, the main idea put forward by the 
Commission in the Fifth Cohesion Report is to link the verification of the principle to the EU 
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economic surveillance process, using the annual indicators already provided by the Member 
States in Stability and Convergence Programmes.  
National views on financial additionality were only provided in a limited number of 
responses to the Fifth Cohesion Report. Two of these welcomed the Commission’s proposals 
for a closer articulation with the Stability and Convergence Programmes (Portugal, 
Slovakia). Others called for greater simplification and clarity (Czech Republic), to restrict 
verification to national co-financing (Austria) and to use the internationally accepted 
COFOG methodology (Hungary). By contrast, Latvia proposed eliminating the principle due 
to its methodological limitations.  
A second principle connected to financial added value is co-financing. In the Cohesion 
Report, the Commission has proposed that co-financing should be reviewed and, possibly, 
differentiated to reflect better the level of development, EU added value, types of action 
and beneficiaries. The national responses to these proposals are mixed. Some countries 
offered support for differentiation according to development (Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
United Kingdom), EU added value, types of activities and beneficiaries (Latvia, Poland), 
while others would like to reduce the EU co-financing rate for all countries (Sweden), 
including a lower maximum rate of 75 percent (instead of 85 percent) (Austria, Finland).  
Beyond these financial dimensions of additionality, the need for more systematic and 
demonstrable policy additionality is recognised in the Fifth Cohesion Report’s proposal to 
make additional resources available for the Commission to promote ‘experimentation and 
networking.’ Most of the national responses did not offer feedback and those that did were 
unsupportive (Finland) or suggested that if such a fund were to be created it should be 
managed by Member States (Hungary and Latvia).  
A well-known constraint on policy added value is the decommitment rule, often criticised 
for incentivising financial absorption over the selection of quality projects with genuine 
added value. To increase the flexibility associated with the rule, the Commission has 
proposed to extend it by one year (i.e. to n+3) for the first year of the new period and to 
apply the rule to all programmes. The proposal has received a mixed response from Member 
State. While several support the proposal (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom), some countries would prefer the current approach to be 
retained (Demark, France), while others would consider that more flexibility is needed, 
such as an N+3 rule for the whole period (Poland), especially for territorial cooperation 
programmes (Czech, Estonia), or by applying the rule at the country (rather than 
programme) level (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) as proposed in the Barca Report.  
5.6.3 Partnership 
The Fifth Cohesion Report underlines the positive role of Cohesion Policy’s partnership 
principle in the delivery of Europe 2020 objectives. It goes on to propose that 
‘representation of local and regional stakeholders, social partners and civil society in both 
the policy dialogue and implementation of Cohesion Policy should be strengthened.’ Aside 
from the ideas on reinforcing the local dimension, the report does not provide specific 
proposals on how this can be achieved in practice, nor was the partnership principle 
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discussed by the Commission and Member States in the High Level Group on Cohesion 
Policy.  
However, the parallel committee (ad hoc group) on the ESF did devote part of a session to 
the partnership principle. The discussions drew on the work of a focus group (including 
experts from managing authorities, from regional/local stakeholders and from the 
Commission) set up to examine reform ideas. The presentation of the focus groups’ work 
stressed the need to distinguish between two different levels of partnership application: 
involvement of partners at the programme level (design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of programmes); and their involvement at the project level (i.e. local 
development project or third sector projects implemented by sub-regional or non-
governmental bodies). At the programme level, the key reform ideas discussed in the group 
included more precise requirements in the regulations, the introduction of a soft law 
approach and extended use of technical assistance.85 Similar ideas have been put forward 
in a European Parliament resolution on governance and partnership-working 86  and an 
exploratory opinion by the ECSC87, including the elaboration of a guide containing a clear 
definition and assessment criteria as well as setting out instruments, tools and good 
practices; the allocation of earmarked funding to implement the partnership principle; a 
requirement for managing authorities to inform partners of their influence on programming; 
and the introduction of a legally-binding principle with verifiable criteria.  
The responses of national policy-makers to these ideas in the ESF committee were 
overwhelmingly negative. The majority did not see the need for additional regulatory 
requirements on partnership, preferring instead a flexible approach to allow the 
implementation of the principle to reflect domestic specificities and institutions; only one 
participant welcomed the idea of clearer and more stringent requirements, including the 
establishment of a code of good practice. Nor was it considered necessary to change 
technical assistance provisions, which may already be used to strengthen the administrative 
capacity of partners.  
Ambivalent positions on the need for change are also evident in the national positions on 
the Fifth Cohesion Report. Most underlined their support for the principle, although very 
few made reform proposals. Some stressed that the current regulations are clear and that 
any challenges that arise are due to implementation challenges (Sweden). Austria, which 
has long-standing experience with partnership-based, neo-corporatist practices, underlines 
that appropriate, stable working arrangements are key for the partnership principle to 
succeed in practice. Related, some responses noted that subsidiarity and proportionality 
                                                 
85 Lefebvre M (2011) Involvement  of  local  act ors in ESF programmes and promot ion of  local  init iat ives 
European Commission, Sixth Meeting of the ESF committee Ad-Hoc Group on the Future of the ESF, 
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must be respected (Estonia, Germany, Greece) and that a standardised approach should be 
avoided (Denmark).  
On the other hand, there were also calls for clearer provisions on, and definitions of, 
partner responsibilities, competences and even sanctions for national, regional and local 
authorities that do not comply with the principle (Bulgaria). The monitoring of partnership 
performance could also be required (Denmark) and, at a minimum, the national contracts 
should outline the approach to partnership (Czech Republic, Italy).  
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6. CONCLUSIONS - ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION 
The aim of this paper has been to review the debate on the post-2013 reform of Cohesion 
policy over the past year. It began by setting out the context for reform in terms of 
economic and fiscal governance developments in response to the Euro difficulties, broader 
policy priorities over the medium-term and progress with Europe 2020 strategic initiatives. 
The Commission’s proposals on the next multi-annual financial framework - a Budget for 
Europe 2020 – were then reviewed, including national reactions and the European 
Parliament’s initial negotiating stance. A prospective analysis of eligibility for Structural 
and Cohesion Funds and the likely financial allocations followed, based on the latest 
Eurostat data and regional growth estimates. Lastly, the policy dimensions of the 
Commission’s proposals on Cohesion policy reform and Member States reactions were 
reviewed on the basis of a meta-analysis of national position papers and reports from the 
informal expert working groups discussing the future of Cohesion policy. This final section 
draws together some of the key conclusions and provides some questions for discussion at 
the EoRPA meeting in relation to four key themes: financial allocations and eligibility; 
strategic objectives and programming; the performance framework; simplification and 
assurance. 
ELIGIBILITY AND ALLOCATIONS 
Decisions on geographical eligibility and financial allocations are always the most politically 
contentious negotiation issues in Cohesion policy reviews due to the redistributive 
consequences and connections to broader budgetary politics in the EU. Reaching agreement 
on the overall size of the EU budget, the share allocated to Cohesion policy and the split 
between funds, objectives and categories of eligible region will arguably be even more 
difficult in the present context of a fragile EU recovery and strained public finances. 
The changing economic landscape has important consequences for eligibility. Regional 
economic growth and the use of EU27 averages have the effect of reducing significantly the 
coverage of the Convergence regions, particularly through the loss of Convergence status 
for several German and Spanish regions along with the capital regions of Poland and 
Romania. The introduction of a new definition of Transitional region will also alter the 
geographical map of intervention. This will comprise: former Convergence regions that have 
‘outgrown’ that status, in line with past transitional arrangements; and regions with GDP in 
the range 75-90 percent of the EU27 average. This is a break with past practice creating a 
new category of assisted area covering over 11 percent of the EU15 population. 
The creation of a transitional category deals with two immediate concerns. First, it 
smoothes the profile of aid, ensuring that economic development in less-developed regions 
is not endangered by the sharp differences in aid intensity and resources in moving from 
Convergence to Regional Competitiveness status. Second, in the political economy of the 
2011-12 budget negotiations, it provides a mechanism for disbursing a significant volume of 
Structural Funds across a wider range of Member States and, in particular, to Germany and 
Spain. However, it also has longer term consequences. By creating a new 'regional 
objective' defined on the basis of specific minima and maxima of GDP per head, it redefines 
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the parameters for future Cohesion policy reforms; a larger group of regions and Member 
States could have expectations of sizeable Structural Funds receipts until their GDP pc 
exceeds 90 percent rather than the 75 percent threshold used hitherto. For critics of the 
policy this will be seen as prolonging ‘subsidy dependence’. 
The Commission’s proposals on a Budget for Europe 2020 suggest a modest decrease in the 
Cohesion Policy budget. This is largely borne by a reduction in Convergence spending, 
although per capita spend on Convergence would rise slightly; RCE spending would rise 
significantly both in absolute and per capita terms; and Transitional region spending would 
increase by half. A key conclusion to emerge from the paper’s analysis is the overriding 
importance of capping in determining financial allocations, especially for the least 
prosperous Member States. The cap proposed is, moreover, substantially lower than it was 
in 2007-13. As a result, for the main beneficiaries of the Convergence and Cohesion Funds 
the outcomes of the allocation formulae are hypothetical and the appropriations are set to 
be determined purely as a proportion of GNI. 
x Are Member States willing to support  the Transit ional regions proposal?  
x How should eligibility and aid intensity be structured to accommodate the mix 
of regions falling into the category? 
STRATEGIC COHERENCE AND PROGRAMMING 
The Commission has proposed to reinforce the strategic approach in Cohesion Policy 
through the introduction of a Common Strategic Framework for shared management funds, 
more binding national Partnership Contracts and greater thematic concentration on Europe 
2020 priorities. The aims are to strengthen the coherence, coordination and 
complementarities among the funds, to integrate them more firmly into the EU’s 
overarching Europe 2020 strategy and to increase visibility and impact.  
While there is strong support for the establishment of a Common Strategic Framework for 
all shared management funds, there are concerns in some Member States about the 
dominance of the Europe 2020 discourse and the lack of attention to the territorial 
dimension which is at the heart of Cohesion Policy and is reaffirmed in the new Treaty. 
That said, territorial cohesion remains undefined and it is not clear what the relationship is 
between the recently agreed Territorial Agenda for Europe 2020 and the future Common 
Strategic Framework. 
A challenge with the introduction of Partnership Contracts is the additional administrative 
workload and costs, particularly if it implies the establishment of a new management layer, 
resembling the Community Support Frameworks in previous programme periods. For federal 
countries, there are important constitutional implications for the relationship between 
federal and state levels of government given the devolved nature of economic development 
competences.  
A rigorous approach to objective-setting and defining thematic priorities would ensure 
concentration of resources and possibly greater and more visible impact. On the other 
hand, there is a serious risk of the sectoralisation of the policy. Especially in Member States 
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receiving limited resources under the Structural Funds, governments may decide to channel 
support through sectoral or thematic programmes, without the kind of territorial approach 
used hitherto. 
x How can an optimal balance be struck between thematic and territorial objectives 
and priorit ies? 
x What level of flexibility should there be in Partnership Contracts and OPs? 
x Would the (re)introduction of mult i-fund OPs encourage more integrated 
approaches to programme design and delivery? 
THE PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK 
The Commission envisages the introduction of a new performance framework centred on 
conditionalities, incentives and performance review. At the most basic level, 
conditionalities have always been part of the Cohesion policy regulatory framework, but the 
conditions have been mainly ‘passive’ once the programmes were agreed. The 2000-06 
marked the first period when ‘active’ conditionalities, related to the operation and 
performance of programmes, were introduced - in the form of the decommitment rule and 
the performance reserve. The Commission is now proposing to take conditionalities to 
another level, with a mix of ex ante economic and institutional conditions that must be in 
place before programmes are adopted and ex-post sanctions when pre-agreed milestones 
are not achieved. Additionally, macro-economic conditionalities linked to Stability and 
Growth Pact compliance would be extended form the Cohesion Fund to other Structural 
Funds including stricter enforcement.   
In this regard, the Commission is responding to the findings of evaluation research and 
other critical analysis of the policy: that its effectiveness has been undermined by 
inadequacies in the macro-economic environment, structural policies and administrative 
capacity. Equally, the lessons from the use of conditionalities within Cohesion policy and 
international institutions is that they can be counter-productive if not applied sensitively 
and in partnership between the donors and recipients of aid. 
Has the Commission found an appropriate balance between the need to improve 
performance and ensure that the condit ionalit ies are acceptable to, and manageable 
by, Member States? What changes could improve the proposals? 
SIMPLIFICATION AND ASSURANCE 
A common complaint of Member States and regions is that the bureaucracy and complexity 
of the Funds cause great difficulty in maintaining a strategic approach to regional 
development. Financial control and audit have taken up a hugely disproportionate amount 
of time and effort relative to the resources involved, compounded further by the lack of 
harmonisation of rules across funds. 
As part of the review of the Financial Regulation, the Commission has proposed to transfer 
the current management and control model of the Common Agricultural Policy to Cohesion 
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policy through annual accreditation, clearance of accounts and reporting; the merger of 
control levels; and a more risk-based or proportionate approach. It argues that this would 
reduce the duplication of functions and controls, avoid problems associated with the 
retention of documents for long periods of time and minimise administrative burdens for 
low-risk programmes. However, such changes may entail more administrative costs and 
disruption, at least in setting up the systems, as well as greater uncertainty at the 
implementation stage. And if the Commission interprets risk narrowly, in terms of the size 
of programmes, it could lead to complaints of unequal treatment from the main beneficiary 
countries. 
The Commission is also known to be looking at the possibility of an ‘umbrella regulation’ to 
provide an overarching regulatory framework for all the ‘Structural funds’ (ERDF, ESF, CF, 
Rural Development, Maritime and Fisheries Fund). Possible areas for common regulatory 
requirements could include: technical definitions (e.g. beneficiary, operation, public 
support / contribution etc.); Operational Programmes (preparation, content, adoption, 
revision); and audit and control requirements (e.g. on eligibility, durability, payment 
recoveries etc.). This would respond to the frequent demand from some Member States and 
other interests for harmonisation of rules. However, in several Member States, the funds 
are administered by different government departments, implementing bodies and 
beneficiaries, which have well-established systems in place for each of the funds - change 
could be seen as unnecessarily disruptive, especially where the resources are relatively 
small. 
x What specific changes to the regulat ions would facilitate a more proport ionate, 
risk-based and fair approach to shared management?  
x To what extent would an umbrella regulat ion, and the harmonisation of (some) 
rules, be seen as desirable? What are the priorit ies for harmonising rules? 
 
